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Abstract
Although the law has traditionally treated non-human animals as property, public
attitudes and many of our current laws already are beginning reflect many ways in which
animals, and especially companion animals, are fundamentally different from inanimate
property. Despite these trends, the differences between animals and inanimate property need to
be more clearly reflected in our laws, because there are still too many cases where the results
under current laws are inconsistent with this understanding of companion animals.
This article proposes the legislative creation of a new status that formally recognizes
companion animals as a distinct legal category: “companion animal property.” A separate
legal category for companion animals has both intuitive appeal and would better reflect the way
in which we value companion animals in our society. In addition to recognizing the bonds
between humans and animals, formally creating a new legal category for companion animals
leads to more consistency in the law and would help to make sense of a number of judicial and
legislative trends that have been emerging in the past decade or more.
Changing the legal status of animals has many positive implications for the veterinary
profession. Previous opposition to such change – driven primarily by fears about increased
malpractice awards – should give way to recognition of the numerous ways the veterinary
profession will benefit from enhancing the legal status of companion animals. It is ultimately in
the best interest of the profession to raise the status of companion animals above that of
inanimate property.
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Introduction
Veterinary medicine has gone through tremendous changes in the past several decades.
Until fairly recently, veterinary practice was viewed primarily as a “service profession to
agriculture,”2 that involved many rote practices such as vaccinating herds of cows. In contrast,
today’s veterinary practice focuses much more heavily on companion animal3 medicine and
includes such specialty areas as veterinary oncology, veterinary orthopedics, veterinary
cardiology, and even veterinary ophthalmology.4 In the ten years from 1991 to 2001, spending
on veterinary care increased nearly three-fold, with expenditures totaling over nineteen billion
dollars.5
Many of these changes can be attributed to the changing relationship that people have
with their animals, and the growing role that our pets, or companion animals, play in our lives.
Because of the way we value our pets, we are much more likely to spend money on their care,
purchase pet health insurance, and expect that they will receive medical care when they are sick
or injured akin to the treatment choices available in human medicine.6 In an interesting example
of “coming full circle,” many human medical advances that were first tested in research
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See BERNARD E. ROLLIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO VETERINARY MEDICAL ETHICS: THEORY AND CASES 59
(1999).
3
Id. at 56. “Companion animal” practice refers to treating animals such as dogs, cats and other small pets.
Other categories of practice include “food animal” (bovine, small ruminants, porcine) and equine. Id.
4
See Christopher Green, Comment, The Future of Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion
Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 163, 211 (2004) (reporting that the vast majority of private veterinarians—eighty-three
percent—work primarily or exclusively with companion animals).
5
See Green, supra note 4, at 220 n.323; see also Rita Giordano, The Love of a Healthy Pet? Priceless, PHILA.
INQUIRER, June 20, 2004, at M1, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/philly/news/local/8959918.htm (citing the
American Veterinary Medicine Association).
6
See Mary Margaret McEachern Nunalee & G. Robert Weedon, Modern Trends in Veterinary Malpractice:
How Our Evolving Attitudes toward Non-human Animals Will Change Veterinary Medicine, 10 ANIMAL L. 125,
139-40 (2004) (discussing pet owners’ desires to pursue sophisticated treatment and high-tech diagnostic tools for
their pets). See also Giordano, supra note 5 (“[I]ncreasingly, pet owners, acting as their animals’ health advocates
as they might for any family member, are demanding cutting-edge treatments and sophisticated—and costly—
diagnostic procedures . . . .”).
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experiments using animal models are now making their way back into veterinary medicine to
treat sick animals.7 For example, choices of which chemotherapeutic agents to use to treat
cancer in dogs and cats are often informed by which of those drugs have been successful in
treating similar cancers in human patients.8
The changes in the way we value our animals are just beginning to be reflected in the
law. The traditional legal view that treats all animals as property is beginning to give way to an
increasing recognition that animals are fundamentally different from inanimate property, and the
law needs to treat them differently. These legal changes are being seen to a limited extent in tort
law—in the way that damages are calculated for lost or injured animals—but to a much greater
extent in other areas of the law, such as estate planning, custody decisions, and increasing
criminal penalties for cruelty to animals.
These legal changes, inspired no doubt by the changes in the way we value companion
animals in our society, may have implications for veterinary medicine and education that go
beyond the changes in societal values that inspired them. The potential effects on veterinary
malpractice liability and damages awards have recently been explored by a number of
commentators.9 Other potential effects have received less attention, such as how these changes
are affecting the professional role of veterinarians, the realities of their practices, and their
7
See Giordano, supra note 5 (“As the wonders of human medicine make their way into veterinary medicine at
an ever-faster rate, animal care experts say pet owners . . . are learning how far they can go—and how much they
can spend—to save their animal loved ones.”)
8
See Fawn Vrazo, In Testing New Drugs, More than a Pet Cause, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 4, 2005, at A1 (“But
while more new animal medications are coming to market . . . veterinarians and animal-welfare groups complain
about a continuing lack of drugs that have been tested and approved specifically for pets. There are no approved
animal cancer chemotherapy drugs or diabetes drugs, for instance. . . .”); Jenny Donelan, Chemo Can Give a Dog
and Owner More Time, BOSTON GLOBE, May 26, 2005, at H3; Warren King, What Price a Pet’s Life?: $45,000 to
Treat Comet, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 6, 2005, at A1 (noting that “[p]et owners may pay thousands for treatments once
reserved for humans, including kidney transplants, gall-stone removal, hip replacements, and chemotherapy,
radiation and surgery for cancer . . . .”). See also Giordano, supra note 5 (reporting that University of Pennsylvania
researchers are working on a tumor vaccine for both children and for pets).
9
See, e.g., Green, supra note 4, at 163; Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice, 35 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 479 (2004); Jayne De Young, Article, Toward a More Equitable Approach to Causation in Veterinary
Malpractice Actions, 16 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 201 (205).
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abilities to exercise their professional judgment.
This article seeks to explore such implications of the legal changes we are beginning to
see by focusing on the changing legal status of companion animals. It will advocate for
continuing a nascent movement away from the law’s traditional approach of treating all nonhuman animals as property, propose a new legal category for companion animals, and discuss the
implications of these changes for the veterinary profession.
Part I will set out the traditional legal view where all animals are treated as property.
This status is seen in cases involving an animal that is injured or lost through another’s
negligence, where the owner10 is only able to recover the animal’s fair market value, and when
“lost property” statutes are used to resolve disputes between losers and finders of lost animals.
Part II will explore some recent changes in both case and statutory law that may be recognizing a
different status for some animals.11 This section will conclude, however, that these judicial and
legislative changes do not clearly reflect a change in the legal status of companion animals, but
may rather merely indicate a different way of valuing this form of property.
Part III will look at other areas where the law more clearly recognizes a different legal
status for at least some animals. In some cases, this recognition is seen in the language used by
courts, whether or not that language actually affects the outcome of the decision.12 The article
will argue that the language seen in these opinions reflects, at a minimum, an increasing
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One state and several local jurisdictions have statutorily changed this status from “owner” to “guardian.” See,
e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-13-1.2(10) and § 4-19-2(28) (Supp. 2003) (adding the definition of “guardian” but not
removing “Owner keeper”); BOULDER, COLO., CODE § 6-1-2 (2005) (“‘Guardian’ means owner”); BERKELEY, CAL.,
CODE § 10.04.010 (2001) (defining “Owner/guardian”); SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE art. I § 41(m) (2003)
(allowing “guardian” and “owner” to be used interchangeably in the Code).
11
There are a number of different ways in which courts have held the value of companion animals to exceed
fair market value, including allowing recovery of “reasonable veterinary expenses” even when those expenses far
exceed animal’s market value; allowing recovery of “actual or intrinsic” value above market value; allowing
recovery for an animal’s companionship and protective value; and allowing recovery of amounts that recognize the
loss of companionship and mental suffering of the animal’s owner. See infra notes 48-110 and accompanying text.
12
See infra notes 140-152 and accompanying text.
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discomfort that judges have with the legal status quo, and an increasing awareness that current
laws are in conflict with the reality of how many people view their animals. This part of the
article will then turn to case and statutory law that more clearly recognize a change in the legal
status of companion animals.13 This section will conclude that there is in fact a trend to change
the legal status of animals, a trend that more accurately reflects the value of companion animals
in our society.
Part IV of the article proposes that the above-described legal changes be formally
recognized by creating a new legal category for companion animals. This section will explore
what that legal category might be, and how it could clarify, in ways that our current laws do not,
the responsibilities that owners have toward their living property that are fundamentally different
from responsibilities toward inanimate property. Such a category should thus take into account
the dependence that companion animals have on their human owners, their capacity to suffer if
mistreated or neglected, and the bonds that we and our animals form with each other. This
section will advocate an incremental change that retains the property status of companion
animals but accords them a place above inanimate property. It will also look at the implications
of creating additional legal distinctions both between14 and within15 species.
The final section, Part V, will look at the implications of such a change on the veterinary
profession. The profession has shown some organized opposition to any changes in the legal
13

Examples will include a Vermont case where the majority refused to apply a lost property statute to resolve a
dispute between the loser and finder of a dog, despite the language in the statute that specified its application to
“stray beasts” (see infra notes 145-158 and accompanying text); cases involving the custody of dogs and cats where
courts apply a “best interest” standard (see infra notes 161-167 and accompanying text); and cases and statutes in
the area of Estates and Trusts, including judicial decisions voiding clauses in wills that instruct that pets be
destroyed and legislation that allows for the creation of binding pet trusts (see infra notes 168-208 and
accompanying text).
14
While many laws, such as the federal Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131-59 (2000), and many state
animal cruelty statutes already treat animals differently by species, most of the recent legal changes apply only in
cases of companion animals and will therefore increase the distinctions between species.
15
To the extent that our legal rules depend on the animals’ roles in lives of humans, it is unclear how the law
will treat animals within the same species that have different roles.
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status of animals. This section will respond to that opposition and will argue that it ultimately is
misplaced: while veterinarians have some legitimate fears about increased malpractice awards,
these fears are generally overblown, and they are far outweighed by the numerous ways their
profession will benefit from enhancing the legal status of companion animals. This section will
conclude that it is ultimately in the best interests of the profession to support incremental
changes in the legal status of companion animals – above that of inanimate property but not
equivalent to personhood.
Part I: Traditional view of animals as property
The law has traditionally treated all non-human animals, including pets, as property.16
Animals are generally categorized as either wild or domestic; pets, or companion animals, are
one of several types of domestic animals.17 Wild animals are considered to be owned by the
state18 (although that ownership can, in certain circumstances, be transferred to individuals),
while domestic animals have individual owners.19 In many respects, our ownership of animals is
identical to our ownership of inanimate property: we can buy and sell them, bequeath them in
our wills, give them away, or choose to “destroy” them.20 Pet animals, like other forms of
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See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Introduction: Animals as Property, 2 ANIMAL L., at i (1996); Harold W.
Hannah, Animals as Property – Changing Concepts, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 571, 572 (2001). See also Harabes v. The
Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (“A review of decisions from other states
reveals that pets are usually classified as personal property . . . .”).
17
See Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of Companion
Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 47, 69 (2002) (citing JAMES F. WILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE VETERINARY
PROFESSION 74 (1988)). See also Hannah, supra note 16, at 574-75.
18
See Hannah, supra note 16, at 572 (footnote omitted): “While statutory provisions declare that ownership of
wildlife is in the state, that ownership may be transferred to hunters and anglers providing they meet the licensing
requirements and abide by hunting and fishing rules established in the state.” But see David Favre, New Property
Status for Animals: Equitable Self-Ownership, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 234,
237 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) [hereinafter ANIMAL RIGHTS] (arguing that “[i]t is a
misperception of existing property law to say that title is in the state when wildlife exists in its natural
environment.”).
19
Gary L. Francione, Animals – Property or Persons?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 108.
20
See id. at 117. State statutes prohibiting animal cruelty do, however, place some limits on how we treat our
animal property, and while they do place limits on an owner’s choice of how to have an animal killed, they generally
do not question an owner’s choice to have an animal humanely euthanized for what may be a trivial reason.
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personal property, can be the subjects of theft21 and subjects of bailment agreements.22 If we
leave our animals at the veterinarian’s office beyond a certain period of time, or do not pay our
bill, the professionals can take ownership of them in much the same way that a garage can take
ownership of our cars.23
This animal-as-property approach is frequently seen in tort cases involving damages for a
negligently lost or injured animal, where courts are only willing to award the “fair market value”
as they would for any other form of property. For example, plaintiffs in an Alaska case located
their missing dog at a local pound and attempted to retrieve him.24 Told that the pound was
closed for the day, they arrived earlier the next day after leaving work early, but found that the
pound had already killed their dog, in violation of a local ordinance that required a seventy-two
hour holding period.25 The pound admitted liability and the only issue at trial was damages.26 In
affirming the lower court’s jury instructions, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the proper
measure of damages was the market value of the dog and not the owner’s subjective estimation
of the pet’s value.27
The legal status of animals as property is also apparent when “lost property” law is used

21

See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(a) (Supp. 2005) (“All dogs are hereby declared to be personal
property and subjects of theft.”). See also the federal Pet Theft Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2131 (2000) (stating that among the
Animal Welfare Act’s purposes is “to protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals . . . .”).
22
See, e.g., Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1151 (Pa. 1996) (holding that, while dogs are personal property and
can thus be subjects of bailment agreements, “allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state
a cause of action against a veterinarian who . . . perform[s] surgery on an animal” that does not survive).
23
See, e.g., 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(c)(2) (Supp. 2005) (setting forth provision regarding
abandonment of animals where an “animal placed in the custody of a licensed doctor of veterinary medicine for
treatment, boarding or other care, . . . which shall be abandoned by its owner or his representative for a period of
more than ten days after written notice . . . may be turned over to the custody of the nearest humane society . . . .”)
24
Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska 1985).
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 456. See also Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 313 (Alaska 2001) (footnote omitted) (“The majority
rule holds that the proper measure of recovery for the killing of a dog is the dog’s fair market value at the time of its
death.”). The Mitchell court, however, chose the minority position and awarded damages representing “the actual
value of the pet to the owner.” Id.
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to resolve disputes between losers and finders of lost animals,28 and where property dissolution
law is used to determine a pet’s fate during a divorce settlement. In a recent Pennsylvania case,
for example, former spouses had entered into a property settlement agreeing that their dog would
live with the wife, but allowing the husband to visit him.29 When the wife moved and no longer
allowed her former husband to visit the dog, he filed a complaint seeking shared custody.30 The
court dismissed the complaint, holding that any terms in the agreement attempting to award
visitation or shared custody were void, because dogs are considered personal property under
Pennsylvania law.31 In affirming the trial court’s dismissal, the Superior Court agreed that
“Appellant is seeking an arrangement analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule for a table or a
lamp.”32
Despite their treatment as property in many areas of the law, there are other ways in
which animals have long been treated differently from non-animate property: state statutes
prohibiting cruelty to animals have been on the books since as early as the 1800s33 and, by some
accounts, go back as early as 1641 to the legal code of Massachusetts Bay Colony.34 No similar
laws exist that prohibit “cruelty” to inanimate property. Animals are treated differently from
inanimate property in practical ways as well. Unlike other “property,” animals possess an ability
to move that can be exercised independently from their owner’s wishes, and certain laws that
recognize this ability exist, if for no other reason than to assure an original owner’s property

28

See, e.g., Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002).
See Desanctis v. Pritchard, 803 A.2d 230, 231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
30
Id.
31
Id. at 232 (citing 3 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 459-601(a).
32
Id.
33
Gary Francione cites an 1821 Maine statute as “[t]he first known anti-cruelty statute in the United States.”
See Francione, supra note 19, at 135, n.14; while other commentators cite to a New York statute that dates to 1866.
See, e.g., William A. Reppy, Jr., Citizen Standing to Enforce Anti-Cruelty Laws by Obtaining Injunctions: The North
Carolina Experience, 11 ANIMAL L. 39, 46 n.38 (2005) (citing N.Y. REV. STAT. ch. 783, 1-10 (1866)).
34
This “Body of Liberties” prohibited “any Tirrany or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie
kept for man’s use.” Cass R. Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, in ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 18, at 251, 252.
29

9

right.35
While valuing animals as property is still the prevailing view, there have been some
recent changes in both case and statutory law that may be recognizing a different status for some
animals. In cases involving the calculation of damage awards, the changes may not so clearly
reflect a change in the legal status of companion animals, but may rather merely indicate a
different way of valuing this form of property.36 In other cases, recognition of a different status
for companion animals can be seen in the language used by courts, whether or not that language
actually affects the outcome of the decision.37 And in yet other examples of changes in both case
and statutory law, we see results that more clearly recognize a change in the legal status of
companion animals.38
Part II: Changes in Damage Awards
A great deal of scholarly attention has been paid to the problems with using fair market
value as a measure of damages for lost or injured companion animals, and the current approach
has been criticized by numerous commentators.39 Commentators have asserted, for example,
that the current approach has failed to “[keep] up with the reality of the relationship between

35

See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 41 (1995) (describing the historical legal
classes of animals, domestic or wild, and the property rights assigned to each class).
36
See supra Part II.
37
See supra Part III A.
38
See supra Part III B.
39
See Elaine T. Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court
and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9 ANIMAL L. 215, 225
(2003); Geordie Duckler, The Economic Value of Companion Animals: A Legal and Anthropological Argument for
Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199, 200 (2002); Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases:
Recognizing Pets’ Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 31, 32 (2001);
Huss, supra note 17, at 47; Margit Livingston, The Calculus of Animal Valuation: Crafting a Viable Remedy, 82
NEB. L. REV. 783 (2004); William C. Root, Note, “Man’s Best Friend”: Property or Family Member? An
Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact on Damages Recoverable for Their
Wrongful Death or Injury, 47 VILL. L. REV. 423, 444 (2002); Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd:
Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in Tort, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1087 (1995); Sonia S. Waisman &
Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of “Non-Economic” Damages for Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals:
A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7 ANIMAL L. 45, 60 (2001).
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companion animals and their human caretakers,”40 because it fails to recognize the value that
many people place on their animals, and leads to both undercompensation41 and
underdeterrence42 in many legal disputes, including the failure to deter veterinarians from
harming the animals in their care.43
The problem with compensating only for the fair market value of companion animals is
illustrated by a story that was recently reported in the Philadelphia Inquirer.44 Warren Clein was
standing in his own driveway with his dog, Daisy, when they were attacked by a neighbor’s
rottweiler that had gotten loose from its yard. Daisy, who was badly injured in the attack, was
taken to Veterinary Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania (VHUP), where she underwent
extensive surgery, and spent five days in intensive care. The bill from VHUP totaled $5265.
Even in the likely possibility that the Cleins are able to establish liability on the part of their
neighbors, they will not be able to recover the amount they spent on Daisy’s surgery and
recuperation, because that amount exceeds her “fair market value” by over $5000. The Cleins
had adopted Daisy, a mix-breed terrier, from a shelter for a $50 fee, and Pennsylvania law does
not allow recovery above the dog’s replacement value.45
Inequities with the “fair market value” approach can be readily seen in the outcome of
this case. If Daisy’s “market value” were really the proper measure of her worth to the Cleins,
40

Huss, supra note 17, at 52.
See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 39, at 816-17.
42
See, e.g., Byszewski, supra note 39, at 232.
43
See Green, supra note 4, at 168.
44
See Stuart Ditzen, Challenging Pa. Law on a Pet’s Value: Couple Seek to Recoup Vet Costs after Dog Attack,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Sept. 5, 2004, at A1.
45
Id. The approach reported in the article is consistent with a 1988 case where the Pennsylvania Superior Court
refused to compensate the owner of a mixed-breed dog who had been negligently killed for loss of companionship
or emotional distress: “Under Pennsylvania law, a dog is personal property. The fundamental purpose of damages
for an injury to or destruction of property by tortious conduct of another is to compensate the injured party for actual
loss suffered. . . . [W]here the property has been destroyed, the measure of damages would be the value of the
property prior to its destruction. Appellants, however, claim that their dog was a unique chattel whose value to them
exceeded the monetary value of a mongrel dog. While the appellants undoubtedly had a sentimental attachment to
their dog, this would not make it unique chattel under the law.” Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1988) (citations omitted).
41
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then, upon realizing the extent of her injuries, they would likely choose to have her humanely
euthanized and then return to the shelter for another $50 replacement dog.46 But few would
criticize the Cleins’ decision to take the course they chose: spending over $5000 for Daisy’s
surgery and hospitalization so they could have their own dog “made whole.” If the decision to
spend the money on the dog’s surgery was a reasonable one, and her injuries were caused by
another’s negligence, then it seems to follow that the negligent party should be liable for paying
those damages.47 But that is not often the outcome when pets are lumped into the same category
as other personal property, and owners can only recover for their fair market value.
A number of courts, however, are beginning to change their approach. In cases involving
injuries to or losses of companion animals, there are a number of different ways in which courts
have held their value to exceed “fair market value.” These approaches include allowing recovery
of “reasonable veterinary expenses” even when those expenses far exceed an animal’s market
value; allowing recovery of “actual or intrinsic” value above market value; allowing recovery for
an animal’s companionship and protective value; and allowing recovery of amounts that
recognize the loss of companionship and mental suffering of the animal’s owner.
A. Reasonable Veterinary Expenses
In a case with facts remarkably similar to the Pennsylvania case described above, a New
Jersey court allowed recovery of “reasonable veterinary expenses” even when those expenses
exceeded the animal’s market value by fivefold.48 Heather Hyland’s ten-year-old Shih Tzu was

46

See, e.g., Livingston, supra note 39, at 792 n.61 (“[G]iven the hundreds of thousands of homeless animals in
the United States, it is quite simple to obtain a pet at a relatively low cost.”) But see Green, supra note 4, at 208
(noting that the magazine DVM termed the choice of euthanasia over treatment “economic euthanasia” and that
owners’ dollar-figure cutoff has been rising, indicating more than simple replacement cost is involved (citing Daniel
R. Verdon, Clients Spending More Before Stopping Treatment, DVM MAG., June 2003, at 1)).
47
Holding the Rottweiler’s owner liable would likely serve not only the tort system’s “corrective justice” goals,
but also the instrumental goal of risk distribution, since such liability is likely to be covered by one’s homeowner’s
insurance.
48
Hyland v. Borras, 719 A.2d 662 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). See also Zager v. Dimilia, 524 N.Y.S.2d
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attacked and seriously injured by a neighbor’s bulldog that had trespassed onto her property.
Hyland spent $2500 on treatment for her dog, five times more than the cost of buying a new Shih
Tzu.49 The defendant bulldog-owners appealed the award of Hyland’s veterinary expenses,
claiming that the proper measure of damages for personal property, such as the dog, is its
replacement cost in cases where the “repair costs outweigh the replacement cost.”50 The court
disagreed with this defense, holding that it was “purely a matter of ‘good sense’ that defendants
be required to ‘make good the injury done’ as the result of their negligence by reimbursing
plaintiff for the necessary and reasonable expenses she incurred to restore the dog to its condition
before the attack.”51 In reaching this decision, the court explicitly recognized that pets belong in
a different category from other types of personal property.52
Other states are relying on legislative changes to recognize reasonable veterinary
expenses as a measure of damages for injured companion animals. For example, in a recently
approved amendment to a Maryland statute that otherwise limits damages for the injury or death
of a pet to compensatory damages, the legislature expanded the definition of “compensatory
damages” to include “the reasonable and necessary cost of veterinary care” in cases involving
either the death or injury to a pet.53 By recognizing that veterinary expenses which may greatly
exceed an animal’s market value properly can be recovered when an animal is killed or injured
968, 970 (Village Justice Ct. 1988) (finding that the proper measure of damages in a case involving injury suffered
by a pet animal is the reasonable and necessary cost of reasonable veterinary treatment).
49
Hyland, 719 A.2d at 662.
50
Id. at 663.
51
Id. at 664. The court went on to say that “[i]mposing these economic losses on defendants not only has the
salutary effect of making plaintiff whole, but it deters an owner of an aggressive dog from negligently allowing it to
run loose, such as occurred here.” Id.
52
See id.:
Most animals kept for companionship have no calculable market value beyond the subjective
value of the animal to its owner, and that value arises purely as the result of their relationship and
the length and strength of the owner’s attachment to the animal. In that sense then, a household
pet is not like other fungible or disposable property, intended solely to be used and replaced after it
has outlived its usefulness.
53
Act of Apr. 26, 2005, ch. 250, 2005 Md. Laws 1301-02 (to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC.
§ 11-110(a)(2)).

13

through another’s negligence, both courts and legislators are finding that fair market value,
alone, is often not a proper measure of damages.
B. Actual Value to Owner
Several courts have allowed recovery amounts above an animal’s market value by taking
into account the animal’s intrinsic value or its actual value to its owner. In Brousseau v.
Rosenthal,54 for example, the court awarded damages when an eight-year-old mixed breed dog
was negligently killed at defendant’s boarding kennel. While finding that the dog had “no
ascertainable market value,” the court nevertheless held that, in order to make the owner whole,
it must assess the dog’s actual value to its owner.55 The owner in this case was an elderly
woman who lived alone and relied on the dog for companionship and protection.56 The court
therefore included loss of companionship57 and protection value as elements of damages.58
Another approach to calculating the animal’s actual value to its owner is to look at what
the owners have been willing to spend on the animal, including their investments in the pet’s
veterinary care. In a case involving one neighbor’s shooting of another’s dog, the Alaska
Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the case, which was based on the grounds
that no compensatory damages were available because the dog had no market value.59 In
reversing, the Supreme Court held that the court was correct in its conclusion that damages could

54

443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
Id. at 286.
56
Id.
57
Note, however, that courts in various jurisdictions, including New York, have traditionally rejected loss of
companionship as an independent cause of action for the loss of a companion animal. See Gluckman v. American
Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Lewis v. Di Donna 743 N.Y.S.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); see
also Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Inc., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Harabes v. The Barkery,
Inc., 791 A.2d 1142, 1144 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001); Oberschlake v. Veterinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785
N.E.2d 811, 815 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
58
Brousseau, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 286.
59
Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309 (Alaska 2001).
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not include either sentimental or companionship value.60 Nevertheless, the court found that the
correct measure of compensatory damages was not fair market value, but rather “value to the
owner.”61 The court suggested that there were a number of different ways to calculate value to
the owner:
[A]n owner may seek reasonable replacement costs--including such items as the
cost of purchasing a puppy of the same breed, the cost of immunization, the cost
of neutering the pet, and the cost of comparable training. Or an owner may seek
to recover the original cost of the dog, including the purchase price and, again,
such investments as immunization, neutering, and training.62
While acknowledging that the standard damages calculation may not adequately compensate the
pet owner for the loss,63 the court reiterated its refusal to include sentimental value 64 as a
component of actual value.65
Using similar reasoning, an Ohio court showed a willingness to adopt an “actual value to
owner” standard when an eight-year-old shepherd was partially paralyzed by negligent surgery.66
Citing the great time and effort the plaintiff had invested in training her dog, the years she spent
trying to rehabilitate him after his surgery, and the dog’s unique nature as “personally suited to
showing and for [plaintiff’s] personal security,” the court awarded $5000 in damages to the
plaintiff.67 Like the Alaska court, however, this court would not include “sentimentality” as an
element of damages.68
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Id. at 312.
Id. at 313.
62
Id. at 314.
63
The court acknowledged in a footnote that “a small minority of jurisdictions has recognized that the value of a
pet dog may include sentimental or companionship value.” See id. at 313 n.20.
64
Even where courts have allowed sentimental value for the loss of a pet, they may not be treating pets
differently than other forms of property which have little market value, but great value to the person who owns it. In
many ways, this type of valuation mirrors a finding of sentimental value for property such as heirlooms; however at
least one court in NY has explicitly distinguished the value of a companion animal from value of an heirloom. See
Corso v. Crawford Cat & Dog Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979).
65
Mitchell, 27 P.3d at 314.
66
McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750 (Ct. Claims Ohio 1994).
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Id. at 752.
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Id.
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More recent cases have attached even higher amounts to a pet’s value to its owner. In a
much publicized 2004 veterinary malpractice case from Orange County, California – billed in
several news reports69 as the largest damage award to date in a veterinary malpractice case – a
jury found that a rescued dog with a market value of only $10 had a unique value to its owner
that amounted to $30,000.70 And even more recently, a woman whose cat was mauled by a
neighbor’s dog was awarded $45,000: $30,000 for the pet’s special value and $15,000 for
emotional distress.71
C. Mental Suffering of Owners as an Element of Damages
Courts have shown a general unwillingness to award damages for the owners’ mental
suffering when their companion animal is injured or killed. In the vast majority of these cases
where claims for mental suffering are disallowed, it is often because the courts decline to extend
such claims to the injury or death of something that the law considers to be property. In the few
cases where courts have allowed mental distress claims, it is almost always in the context of a
claim for intentional – and not negligent – infliction of emotional distress, where the behavior of
the defendant has been particularly egregious, enough so to meet the outrageousness element of
the claim. It is not always clear, in these cases, whether the courts would be similarly willing to
extend emotional distress damages to a loss of inanimate property. In at least one case, however,
a court made clear that emotional distress damages were in fact available for the negligent
destruction of property.
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See, e.g., Riley Jason, Man Sues Vet Over Dog’s Death, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), July 18, 2005,
at 1A; Philip Sherwell, Now Pets Are Really Part of the Family, Thanks to U.S. “Paw Laws”, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH
(London), June 26, 2005, at 27; Laura Parker, When Pets Die at the Vet, Grieving Owners Call Lawyers, USA
TODAY, Mar. 15, 2005, at 1A.
70
See William Hageman, Paw law: Is Your Pet Entitled to his Day in Court? The Answer: Maybe, CHI. TRIB.,
June 5, 2005, at Q1. The jury awarded an additional $9000 in veterinary bills. Id.
71
Warren Cornwall & Craig Welch, $45,480 Ruling in Cat’s Death, SEATTLE TIMES, May 9, 2005, at A1;
Associated Press, Woman gets $45K for Cat Killed by Dog, ABC NEWS, May 9, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=740793.
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There are numerous examples of cases where courts have disallowed damages for mental
suffering precisely because of the property status of the killed or injured animal.72 More unusual
are cases like Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, where a Hawaii court allowed an
emotional distress claim for the negligent loss of a pet despite the animal’s status as property.73
The Campbell’s family dog, Princess, died from heat prostration when the state Animal
Quarantine Station negligently transported her in an unventilated van on a hot day.74 After
hearing evidence of the family’s distress upon hearing of their pet’s death, the trial court found
the state liable and awarded damages both for the loss of the dog and for the family’s emotional
distress.75 Defendants appealed the award of damages for emotional distress, on the grounds that
such damages were not proper when the loss involved personal property.76 Hawaii’s Supreme
Court rejected this argument, noting that Hawaii’s “unique approach to the area of recovery for
mental distress . . . allowed recovery for mental distress suffered as the result of the negligent
destruction of property.”77 Not surprisingly, this approach has not been followed in other
jurisdictions, which allow negligent infliction of emotional distress claims only in a narrow range
of circumstances.
Courts have shown more of a willingness to award emotional distress damages when pets
are killed or injured due to intentional, rather than negligent conduct, especially where the
defendant’s behavior is particularly egregious. In Burgess v. Taylor,78 for example, where
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See, e.g., Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc.,
844 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001). See also
Myers v. City of Hartford, 853 A.2d 621 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (where an appellate court held that the common law
did not recognize emotional distress claims for “injury to such property as a pet.” Id. at 625).
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632 P.2d 1066 (Haw. 1981).
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Id. at 1067.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 1071.
77
Id. (citation omitted).
78
44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).
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defendant lied to the plaintiff horse-owner and sold her horses to a known slaughter-buyer,79 the
court rejected defendant’s contention that the award should have been limited to the horses’ fair
market value because of their status as property.80 Rather, the court found that, in determining
whether there is a viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is “the conduct
of the offender rather than the subject of the conduct that determines whether the conduct was
outrageous.”81 The court thus found a viable emotional distress claim, despite the horses’ status
as property.
The same court next addressed the question of emotional distress damages for the loss of
a pet animal when plaintiffs brought a claim against the county dog warden for impounding and
shooting their family dog.82 Citing Burgess for the proposition that “[s]imply because a claim
involves an animal does not preclude a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress,”83
the court nevertheless found that such a claim was not supported here where there was the
required element of intent was not met: there was no evidence that the defendant intended to
inflict harm on the family.84 The difference between the outcomes of these two cases can be
explained by the nature of the respective defendants’ conduct: where the conduct of the
79

Id. at 809. The story’s details highlight the egregious nature of the defendant’s behavior: Plaintiff Taylor
owned two Appaloosa horses, Poco and P.J., that she kept as pets. When she found herself in circumstances where
she could no longer care for her pet horses, Taylor entered into "free-lease agreement" with defendant Burgess.
Under this arrangement, Burgess, who had a farm with her own horses, would take care of Poco and P.J. in
exchange for the enjoyment of having them; Taylor, in turn, would remain the horses’ owner and could visit them
whenever she liked. However, within days of taking possession of the horses, Burgess contacted Jackson, a known
slaughter-buyer, and sold the horses to him for $1000. When Taylor contacted Burgess in an attempt to visit her
horses about a week later, Burgess lied to her, and invented a story about giving them to Randolph. Randolph, in
turn, gave Taylor vague directions to a fictitious location, where she tried in vain to search for her horses. Id.
80
Id. at 812.
81
Id. at 809. The court went on to find that:
[T]he Burgesses’ conduct clearly rises to the level of being outrageous and intolerable in that it offends
generally accepted standards of decency and morality, certainly a situation “in which the recitation of the facts to an
average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
‘Outrageous!’” Id. at 811 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46, cmt. d (1965)).
82
Ammon v. Welty 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).
83
Id. at 188.
84
Id.
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defendants in Burgess was found to be both intentional and outrageous; the defendant’s conduct
in Ammon did not meet either of these required elements.85
Similar analysis was employed by the Third Circuit when it held that, under Pennsylvania
law, the wrongful killing of a pet dog could support a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.86 Plaintiff’s pet Rottweiler, Immi, had escaped from its yard and wandered
into the next door alley.87 A police officer, passing in his patrol car, stopped and confronted the
dog.88 Although the dog was not in any way aggressive toward the officer, he reached for his
gun.89 The plaintiff then saw what was happening and shouted that the dog was hers and not to
shoot.90 After briefly hesitating, the officer proceeded to shoot the dog five times, killing it.91
Plaintiffs brought multiple claims against the police officer and other defendants, including a
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.92 Despite defendant’s argument that “the
killing of a pet under any circumstances would not be recognized by Pennsylvania courts as
extreme or outrageous,”93 the court upheld the claim:
Given the strength of community sentiment against at least extreme forms of
animal abuse and the substantial emotional investment that pet owners frequently
make in their pets, we would not expect the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to
rule out all liability predicated on the killing of a pet.94
The court distinguished several Pennsylvania cases that found against such claims, on the
85

This distinction easily explains the difference in outcome between the two cases. It is not the case, as one
commentator suggested, simply that courts are failing to be consistent in measuring damages for the death of pet
animals. See Green, supra note 4, at 166 (“modern courts actually are moving further away from consensus on the
companion animal valuation question”) and id. at 166 n.9 (citing Burgess and Ammon as examples of such lack of
consensus).
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Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Id. at 209.
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Id.
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Id.
90
Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 217.
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Id. at 218.
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Id.
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grounds that these cases involved either negligent behavior or behavior that was not intended to
inflict severe emotional distress on the animals’ owners.95 Here, in contrast, the court found that
“a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Officer Eberly shot Immi either intending to cause
Kim Brown severe emotional distress or with the knowledge that the infliction of such distress
on her would be virtually certain.”96
While Burgess, Ammon, and Muhlenberg make clear that a claim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress will not fail simply because it involves a pet animal, it is less clear if the
courts would have been as likely to find the outrageous element met in a case involving
inanimate property rather than pet horses and dogs. The Muhlenberg court’s language,
particularly its reference to the “substantial emotional investment that pet owners frequently
make in their pets”97 suggests that animals hold a special place. While it is certainly possible,
perhaps likely, that the plaintiffs’ relationships with their animals played a significant role in
courts’ findings that behavior which resulted in animal’s destruction or injury was outrageous, it
is also possible to imagine similar findings when defendants behave particularly egregiously in
destroying inanimate property, such as irreplaceable family photographs, to which a plaintiff has
a strong sentimental attachment. Thus, while numerous courts have categorically denied
emotional distress damages for the killing of animals, the few courts that have allowed such
damages have generally done so on theories that might apply to inanimate as well as animate
property.98
D. Going Beyond the Changes Seen in the Courts
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Id. (discussing Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988), and Miller v. Peraino, 626 A.2d 637 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993)).
96
Id. at 219.
97
269 F.3d at 218.
98
And in Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, explicitly so. 632 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Haw. 1981).
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Despite the large number of cases where plaintiffs have challenged the general rule that
only allows recovery for an animal’s fair market value, few courts have diverged very far from
this standard. While many courts do appear sympathetic to such claims, most also see their
choices as being limited by existing law, and few courts seem to see themselves in a position to
change that law. In some cases, intermediate appellate courts have deferred to higher courts to
make these changes in the laws,99 while in others, the courts defer to legislative bodies to make
such changes.100 Given the unwillingness of most courts to make such changes, it is not
surprising that we are beginning to see legislative response in a number of states. It is also
unsurprising that many of the proposals set forth by commentators who advocate continuing this
trend seek to build on these legislative responses.
1. Changes in Statutory Law
Tennessee was the first state to enact legislation increasing the damages allowed for a lost
or injured animal.101 Known as the T-Bo Act of 2000, and named for the pet Shih Tzu of the
state legislator who proposed the bill,102 the Tennessee statute allows recovery for non-economic
damages for the loss of a pet, including “reasonably expected society, companionship, love and
affection for the pet.”103 While going further than most common law extensions by explicitly
allowing the recovery of non-economic damages, the Tennessee law contains a number of
limitations, including a damage limit of $4000,104 and exemptions for non-profit entities,
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See Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 565 (Tex. App. 2004).
See, e.g., Koester v. VCA Animal Hosp. 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
emotional distress damages are not available for death of a dog because pets are personal property, but inviting
plaintiff and others to urge the Legislature to “visit this issue in light of public policy considerations . . . .”)
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See TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (Supp. 2005).
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See McEachern Nunalee & Weedon, supra note 6, at 144.
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TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(d) (Supp. 2005).
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Interestingly, this damage cap of $4000 in a statute that increases the allowed categories of damages is
considerably lower than the $7500 cap on damages in a Maryland statute that was enacted to limit the damages for
the death or injury to a pet to compensatory damages. See Act of Apr. 26, 2005, ch. 250, 2005 Md. Laws 1301-02
(to be codified at MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-110(a)(2)).
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government agencies, and licensed veterinarians.105 It also limits its application to dogs and
cats;106 any other lost pet would not be covered by the statute.
A 2004 Connecticut statute is even more limited.107 This enactment limits its coverage to
domesticated dogs and cats,108 only applies when a companion animal is intentionally,109 not
negligently, killed or injured, and does not expand recovery to non-economic damages.110 The
law does, however, expand the range of economic damages that can be recovered “including, but
not limited to, expenses of veterinary care, the fair monetary value of the companion animal and
burial expenses for the companion animal.”111 Under this law, an owner whose animal was
intentionally injured would presumably be able to recover the costs of treating such injuries,
even if those costs were in excess of the animal’s fair market value. This law also allows courts
to award punitive damages, but provides exemptions to such awards similar to the exemptions
set out in the Tennessee statute.112
Illinois has chosen a somewhat different approach to recognizing awards of noneconomic damages, by including such a provision for civil actions in its Humane Care for
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Id. § 44-17-403 (a) & (e).
See id. § 44-17-403 (b): “As used in this section, ‘pet’ means any domesticated dog or cat normally
maintained in or near the household of its owner.”
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authorized by law.” Id. § 22-351a(b).
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Id. § 22-351(b).
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Id. § 22-351(b).
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See id. § 22-351(c) and (d):
The court shall not assess punitive damages and a reasonable attorney’s fee pursuant to subsection
(c) of this section against: (1) A veterinarian licensed pursuant to chapter 384 while following
accepted standards of practice of the profession, (2) the state or any political subdivision of the
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Animals Act, the state anti-cruelty statute.113 Section 16.3 of the Act allows an animal’s owner
to bring a civil action against someone who kills or injures her animal, but only where the
defendant commits aggravated cruelty114 or torture115 as defined by the Act, or if the defendant
kills an animal while acting in bad faith under the Act’s sections 3.06 (dealing with the
disposition of seized companion animals and animals used for fighting purposes)116 or section 12
(impounding animals).117 As long as these conditions are met, however, the statute allows a
broad range of damages:
Damages may include, but are not limited to, the monetary value of the animal,
veterinary expenses incurred on behalf of the animal, any other expenses incurred
by the owner in rectifying the effects of the cruelty, pain, and suffering of the
animal, and emotional distress suffered by the owner. In addition to damages that
may be proven, the owner is also entitled to punitive or exemplary damages of not
less than $500 but not more than $25,000 for each act of abuse or neglect to
which the animal was subjected. In addition, the court must award reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs actually incurred by the owner in the prosecution of any
action under this Section.118
Illinois thus takes a very expansive stance on the types of damages that can be awarded in a civil
action, including even damages for the owner’s emotional distress. It places limitations,
however, on the situations where such damages are available, by requiring not just intentional
behavior but bad faith, torture, and aggravated cruelty.
2. Proposals for Change Set Forth by Commentators
Several of the commentators who have criticized the current approach to the valuation of
animals have set forth proposals that build on these legislative models. Waisman and Newell,
113

Humane Care for Animals Act, 510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/1 et. seq. (West 2004).
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115
Torture is committed “when that person without legal justification knowingly or intentionally tortures an
animal. For purposes of this Section, and subject to subsection (b), ‘torture’ means infliction of or subjection to
extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering, or agony of the animal.”
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3.03(a) (West 2004).
116
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/3.06 (West 2004).
117
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/12 (West 2004).
118
510 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (West 2004).
114

23

who criticize the Tennessee statute as “extremely limited in scope, probably due to political
exigencies in that particular state,”119 propose legislation that would be much more
comprehensive in compensating for the injury or loss of a companion animal:
[D]amages shall be recoverable for the human companion’s mental anguish,
emotional distress, and other non-economic injuries, including the loss of society,
companionship, comfort, protection and services; for veterinary and other special
care required; for reasonable burial expenses; for court costs and attorney’s fees,
and other reasonable damages resulting from the willful, wanton, reckless or
negligent act or omission.120
Another commentator, Margit Livingston, proposes compensating owners for the loss of
intangible elements of the human-animal relationship, including loss of companionship of the
animal for a “reasonable replacement period,” and compensation for the “mental anguish
experienced by plaintiffs upon the untimely death of their companion animal . . . .”121 Yet
another proposal builds on approaches taken by the few courts that have been willing to extend
damages beyond market value, proposing that courts use a “value to owner” standard, including
a loss of companionship component, and advocating for the award of punitive damages “where
the conduct of the defendant is particularly heinous.”122 Byszewski presents an interesting
proposal that builds on an idea first adopted by a court in a wrongful death suit for a negligently
killed child.123 Applying the court’s “loss of investment” approach to negligently killed animals,
she proposes that courts use the expected cost of care over the animal’s life expectancy had it not
been killed to estimate the animal’s true value to its owner or guardian, including its
companionship value.124
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All of these proposals, and to a lesser extent the statutes,125 take a different approach
from the judicial decisions that have allowed for valuation above an animal’s market value.
Unlike the case law, these proposals look to change the law by recognizing that the legal status
of animals should be different from that of inanimate property, and the calculation of damages
awards should reflect that difference.
Part III: Recognizing a Change in The Legal Status of Companion Animals
Most of the courts that have allowed damage awards above an animal’s fair market value
do not, ultimately, say anything changing the legal status of animals to something other than
property. Rather, these courts merely seem to be looking at different ways of valuing this form
of property.126 In a few cases, however, courts have actually been willing to entertain the idea
that animals are in a different legal category than inanimate property. One of the ways we see
this recognition is in the language that courts use in deciding cases involving the loss or injury of
companion animals. In some cases, this language may actually affect outcome of the court’s
opinion; in others, however, the language is merely dicta, and effects no changes in the law.
A. Changes Evidenced by Language Used by Courts
Language from Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc.,127 a case decided by the
Queens County Civil Court in New York, has been cited numerous times by courts,
commentators, and advocates.128 In awarding emotional distress damages when the body of
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By including damages for the “reasonably expected society, companionship, love and affection for the pet,”
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plaintiff’s fifteen-year-old poodle was mishandled after its death, the court created a special legal
status for companion animals:
[T]he court must first decide whether a pet such as a dog is only an item of personal
property as prior cases have held. This court now overrules prior precedent and holds
that a pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person
and a piece of personal property.129
The court thus awarded damages for the plaintiff’s mental anguish above the market value of the
dog. In doing so, it made a special point to narrow its decision to the loss of animals, specifically
distinguishing the loss of inanimate property:
This decision is not to be construed to include an award for the loss of a family
heirloom which would also cause great mental anguish. An heirloom while it
might be the source of good feelings is merely an inanimate object and is not
capable of returning love and affection. It does not respond to human stimulation;
it has no brain capable of displaying emotion which in turn causes a human
response. Losing the right to memorialize a pet rock, or a pet tree or losing a
family picture album is not actionable. But a dog – that is something else. To say
it is a piece of personal property and no more is a repudiation of our humaneness.
This I cannot accept.130
Despite this case’s strong language, clear message, the effect of that message on the
outcome of the case, and all the other courts and commentators who have cited it, Corso actually
has very little precedential value. Its holding has not been followed by subsequent New York
cases. Several recent cases have simply ignored the Corso “holding” and have instead asserted
that New York law recognizes pets as personal property,131 and because pets are personal
property, plaintiffs cannot recover emotional distress damages for their loss.132 And a federal

York and other jurisdictions, numerous secondary sources, and a half dozen appellate petitions.
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132
Mercurio v. Weber, 2003 WL 21497325 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 2003). This case further repudiates the Corso
holding by finding that, “[i]f plaintiff could recover for the emotional distress of losing her dog, such logic could be
extended to allow recovery for emotional distress caused by the destruction of other sentimental items like family
heirlooms, class rings or old pictures.” Id. at *1. See also Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996) (“It is well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for the negligent destruction of
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court, deciding a case under New York law, described Corso’s holding that a pet was more than
property as an “aberration[] flying in the face of overwhelming authority to the contrary.”133 The
federal district court criticized the Corso opinion for providing “no legal reasoning why prior
precedent should be overruled in categorizing pets as more than property.”134 Thus the Corso
language, despite its appeal to many, essentially sits on the books as a lower court opinion with
little actual clout.
Similarly strong language can be seen in a Wisconsin case, where the plaintiff sought
damages for emotional distress when a police officer fatally shot her dog:
At the outset, we note that we are uncomfortable with the law’s cold
characterization of a dog . . . as mere “property.” Labeling a dog “property” fails
to describe the value human beings place upon the companionship that they enjoy
with a dog. A companion dog is not a fungible item, equivalent to other items of
personal property. A companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room
furniture. This term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship
between a human and a dog.135
While this language has also been cited and quoted by other courts and commentators,136 it
remains dicta; what the court said actually had no effect on the outcome of the case. Despite the
concern it expressed with the above language, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not see itself in
a position to change “established legal doctrine” and thus refused to award emotional distress
damages for loss of a dog.137

a dog.”); Johnson v. Douglas, 723 N.Y.S.2d 627, 628 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (“[T]he court is not about to recognize a
tortious cause of action to recover for emotional distress due to the death of a family pet”).
133
Gluckman v. American Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
134
Id.
135
Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 2001) (footnotes omitted).
136
See, e.g., Harabes v. The Barkery, Inc., 791 A.2d 1142 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2001).
As recognized by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, “[l]abeling a dog ‘property’ fails to describe
the value human beings place upon the companionship that they enjoy with a dog . . . A
companion dog is not a living room sofa or dining room furniture. This term inadequately and
inaccurately describes the relationship between a human and a dog.” Nevertheless, there is no
authority in this state for allowing plaintiffs to recover non-economic damages resulting from
defendants’ alleged negligence.
Id. at 1146 (citation omitted).
137
Rabideau, 627 N.W.2d at 798. A very similar result, as well as very similar language can found in a 2004
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Judge Andell’s concurring opinion in a Texas Court of Appeals case concerning damages
for a hunter’s negligent killing of plaintiff’s dogs expresses a similar sentiment:
Society has long since moved beyond the untenable Cartesian view that animals
are unfeeling automatons and, hence, mere property. The law should reflect
society’s recognition that animals are sentient and emotive beings that are capable
of providing companionship to the humans with whom they live. . . .
Losing a beloved pet is not the same as losing an inanimate object, however
cherished it may be. Even an heirloom of great sentimental value, if lost, does not
constitute a loss comparable to that of a living being.138
Andell chose to write separately from the majority in order “to address what I consider to be a
more substantial basis for affirming this award, namely, the intrinsic or special value of domestic
animals as companions and beloved pets.”139
All three of these cases express, in strong language, important and meaningful differences
between animals and inanimate property. Yet they represent little, if any, actual changes in the
law. One is a lower court opinion that has not been followed, even in its own jurisdiction,
another is mere dicta, and the third is language in a concurrence. But despite the minimal
precedential weight of these cases, the language used in these opinions reflects, at a minimum, an
increasing discomfort that some judges have had with the legal status quo – it is clear that this is
an area where the established law is in conflict with the reality of how many people view
companion animals.140

Connecticut case, where the appellate court found that a plaintiff whose dog was removed and euthanized by animal
control officers had failed to state a claim because the common law did not recognize emotional distress claims for
“injury to such property as a pet.” The court’s language sounds very much like that in the Rabideau case:
Labeling a pet as property fails to describe the emotional value human beings place on the companionship
that they enjoy with such an animal. Although dogs are considered property; see General Statutes § 22350; this term inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between an individual and his or her
pet. That having been said, there is no common-law authority in this state that allows plaintiffs to recover
noneconomic damages resulting from a defendant’s alleged negligent or intentional act resulting in the
death of a pet . . . .
Myers v. City of Hartford, 853 A.2d 621, 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
138
Bueckner v. Hamel, 886 S.W.2d 368, 377-78 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (Andell, J. concurring).
139
Id. at 373.
140
See infra notes 265-266 and accompanying text, discussing the numerous ways in which behavior towards
pets demonstrates the extent to which our society has come to value companion animals.
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B. Court Decisions and Legislative Enactments that Recognize a Change in the Legal
Status of Companion Animals
If valuation of damages for lost or injured animals were the only legal area affected, it
might be less important to change an animal’s status. But courts are also called upon to resolve
disputes between losers and finders of pet animals, resolve other animal custody disputes, and
deal with provisions of wills that request that the animals be destroyed upon the owner’s death.
And state legislatures are acting in ways that recognize a change in the status of animals by
creating legislation that allows for enforceable trusts to ensure animals’ care after the owner dies
and by increasing penalties under their animal cruelty statutes.
1.

Lost & Found Animal Disputes

Many lost animals end up at local shelters. Shelters have specific roles in caring for lost
animals and finding new homes for them. As a result, specific laws have developed regulating
shelters. State statutes regulate how long a shelter must keep a found animal before adopting it
out to another family;141 whether there needs to be any holding period at all when an owner
surrenders an animal to a shelter; and what efforts, if any, the shelter must make to find the
animal’s original owner.142 If the shelter complies with the statutory requirements, courts do not
interfere with their decision to adopt out an animal.143 Courts have also declined to require
shelters to disclose the identity of the animal’s new owner when the original owner requests this
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In addition to the shelter holding periods mandated by state statutes, the Federal Pet Theft Act (a part of the
Animal Welfare Act) requires that shelters hold pets for at least five days before selling them to a dealer, a provision
that was enacted to minimize the risks of stolen pets being sold for research. See 7 U.S.C. § 2158 (2000).
142
See generally Patricia A. Bolen, Lost and Found: Humane Societies’ Rights and Obligations Regarding
Companion Animal Ownership, ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER (2005),
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/dduspetadoption.htm.
143
Id. See also Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody, and Estate Planning Issues Relating to Companion
Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV 181, 216 (2003) (“The clear trend among appellate cases is that once an adoption has
been made through a recognized humane society, especially if the society followed the standards set forth under
relevant law, the adoption will be upheld.”)
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information from the shelter that adopted the animal out.144
But disputes sometimes develop when someone loses a companion animal and a private
person takes in that animal – bypassing the shelter system and the laws that apply in that context.
One such case was Morgan v. Kroupa,145 where the Vermont Supreme court recognized that a
pet dog’s status is different from that of property.
In July 1994, Mary Morgan found a dog that had been lost by Zane Kroupa.146 Morgan
made several efforts to locate the dog’s owner: reporting to the local humane society, posting
notices in area parks and stores, and arranging for announcements on a local radio station.147
When these efforts to locate the dog’s owner failed, she took the dog in, took care of it, and
“considered it the household pet.”148 More than a year later, Kroupa, who lived two miles from
Morgan, discovered where the dog was and sought to have it returned.149 He drove to Morgan’s
house and left with the dog. Morgan brought an action to recover the dog.150
In affirming trial court’s decision to award possession of dog to Morgan, the Vermont
Supreme Court declined to apply Vermont’s lost property statute, despite language in the statute
covering “stray beasts.”151 The court determined that this language was not intended to apply to
lost pets, but rather “agricultural animals of substantial monetary value.”152 The court declined
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See John J. Tiemessen & Jason A. Weiner, Commentary, The Golden Retriever Rule: Alaska’s Identity
Privilege for Animal Adoption Agencies and for Adoptive Animal Owners, 21 ALASKA L. REV. 77 (2004).
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702 A.2d 630 (Vt. 1997).
146
Id. at 631.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
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The court noted:
Vermont’s lost property statute provides that a person who “finds money or goods, to the value of
$3.00 or more, or takes up a stray beast, the owner of which is not known, shall, within six days
thereafter, make two notices, describing such money, goods or beast, with the natural or artificial
marks, with the time and place of finding or taking up the same, and post them in two public
places in town in which such property was found.”
Id. at 632, citing 27 VT. STAT. ANN. § 1101.
152
Id.
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to apply the lost property statute to a lost pet because, “pets generally do not fit neatly within
traditional property law principles.”153 In reaching its decision, the court’s language recognized
that pets belong in a different category from other forms of property: “Like most pets, [the dog’s]
worth is not primarily financial, but emotional; its value derives from the animal’s relationship
with its human companions.”154
Instead of applying the lost property statute to this dispute, the court decided to fashion
new rules that would recognize “the substantial value that society places on domestic
animals.”155 The court further determined that it would be against the public interest not to
provide incentives for finders of lost animals to take in, care for and develop relationships with
them.156 The result in this case was that Morgan, who found the dog and cared for it for over a
year, was awarded possession of the dog.157
An interesting aspect to this case was the approach taken by the trial court. While the
lower court opted to treat the case as a simple property case and apply Vermont’s lost property
statute (a result which was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court), it acknowledged that the
case might be approached under a number other legal theories, including weighing the
“emotional attachment” of the two parties, and notably, “inquiring into what was in the ‘best
interests’ of the dog,” similar to the approach taken in child custody cases.158 While neither the
trial court nor the appellate court opted to take this last approach, both courts at least entertained
the possibility.
While the Morgan court’s approach clearly places companion animals in a different
153

Id. at 633. The court went on to cite language from Corso v. Crawford Dog & Cat Hosp., Inc., 415 N.Y.S.2d
182, 183 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979): “[A] pet is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a
person and a piece of personal property.”
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Morgan, 702 A.2d at 633.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 631.
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category from other property (including, notably, other animal property), this approach is not one
that has yet been embraced by other courts, either in process or in result.159 Nevertheless, the
case provides an important example of how traditional property concepts provide an inadequate
framework for decisions involving the custody of lost and found pets, and a useful jumping-off
point for proposals on how such disputes might be addressed in the future. One commentator,
for, example, has proposed that a balancing test be used to the weigh interests of the pet’s
original owners with those of the person who found the pet and subsequently bonded with it.160
2.

Pet Custody Cases

Several courts have, in fact, applied a “best interest” standard in resolving custody
disputes over companion animals. And while this approach appears to represent a minority
position161 at this time, it indicates another important inroad into the legal system’s view of
companion animals as something distinct from inanimate property.162 In one New York case, for
example, the court used the best interest standard of child custody cases to determine that it was
in the best interests of an elderly cat to remain at the home where he has “lived, prospered, loved
and been loved for the past four years.”163 In another, there was dispute over a cat’s legal
custody after two unrelated roommates separated.164 In awarding custody to one of the
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See, e.g., Williams v. McMahan, No. 26983-0-II, 2002 WL 242538 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2002)
(applying property principles, the trial court ordered a dog returned to its original owner after the person who found
the dog had kept and cared for the dog for nine months).
160
See Huss, supra note 143, at 218-19.
161
See id. at 221 (“Usually, animals are treated in property settlements as just another form of personal property
and assigned a monetary value.”). See also id. at 225, discussing Nuzzaci v. Nuzzaci, No. CN194-10771, 1995 WL
783006 (Del. Fam. Ct. Apr. 19, 1995), where a Delaware court “declined to apply the best interests of the animal
approach.”
162
See Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing Crack in the ‘Legal Thinghood’ of Nonhuman
Animals, 6 ANIMAL L. 179 (2000).
163
Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308, 309 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999).
164
See Brooke A. Masters, In Courtroom Tug of War Over Custody, Roommate Wins the Kitty, WASH. POST,
Sept. 13, 1997, at B1 (describing Arlington, Virginia’s Judge Kendrick’s resolution of the struggle between Andrew
Zovko and Kovar Gregory over the possession of their cat, Grady).
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roommates, the judge took into account what was in the best interest of the cat.165
Cases using a “best interest” standard to determine pet custody have generated a fair bit
of coverage in the popular media,166 not all of it positive, but the idea is becoming more and
more mainstream. One legal commentator, for example, has recently proposed the development
of statutory provisions to determine pet custody using a “best interests of the animal” approach
and modeling the provisions on child custody statutes.167 Such an approach makes good sense
given the ways in which many human families regard their pets as part of the family and how
most people regard their pets in ways very different from the way they regard their inanimate
property.
3.

Estates and Trusts

Estate Planning and Administration is another area of law that demonstrates important
differences in the ways both courts and legislatures are treating animate versus inanimate
property. There are a number of examples of judicial decisions where clauses in wills that
instruct that pets be destroyed are voided as “against public policy.” A more recent, and perhaps
much more far-reaching development is the adoption of legislation in a number of jurisdictions
that allows for the creation of binding pet trusts that are set up to insure that a companion animal
is well cared for after its owner’s death.
a. Judicial Decisions Voiding Clauses Instructing That Animals Be Destroyed
165

See Newell, supra note 162, at 180 (“According to the Washington Post, “for [Judge] Kendrick, Grady’s
happiness took priority . . . . Kendrick said he would decide ‘what is in the best interest of Grady . . . .’” (quoting
Masters, supra note 164).
166
See, e.g., Angelica Martinez, Kitty Custody – What Happens to Pets When Owners Separate, CAT FANCY,
Apr. 2004, at 34. This article explains that because people are treating their companion animals like family
members, and often like children, pet custody battles are becoming more prevalent in divorce cases. To decide these
cases, some courts are using the best interest standard to decide which person should receive custody, much like
they do in child custody cases. Additionally, judges are asking to hear arguments on who is the better “parent” to
the animal. In some cases, parties are using experts, pet therapists, and specialist to make these arguments. Couples
have been granted joint custody, and the court can award visitation rights and financial support – a process which
has been dubbed, “petimony.”
167
See Huss, supra note 143, at 227-29.
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The Estate of Howard Brand168 is a frequently cited example of a court’s willingness to
void a testamentary clause calling for the destruction of animals. Perhaps this case is so often
cited because it so well exemplifies the difference between animals and inanimate property, both
in the public reaction to clauses calling for destruction and in the legal remedies that courts are
willing to fashion. Brand’s will included a provision that, upon his death, his Cadillac be
crushed and his horses be destroyed.169 When the provisions of his will became known, there
was very little concern expressed about crushing the car,170 but a great deal of public outcry
about the fate of horses. A neighbor of Brands’ sought a way to contest his will, and the story
was reported in a local newspaper, which eventually led to the formation of “The Coalition to
Save Brand’s Horses.”171 The group, which included organizations such as the Vermont
Humane Federation and the Student Animal Legal Defense Fund of the Vermont Law School,
filed a motion for Preliminary Injunction and a Motion to Intervene.172 Numerous people
contacted the coalition offering to adopt the horses if their lives were spared.173
While Brand’s attorney argued that the will provision was legal, represented his client’s
final wishes, and should therefore be upheld,174 the court sided with the coalition and refused to
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Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of
Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT. L. REV. 911, 934 (2001) (citing In re Brand’s Estate, No. 28473 (Vt.
Chittenden Cty. Prob. Ct. Mar. 17, 1999)).
169
Id. “The court acknowledged the fact that Mr. Brand was attempting to thwart any possibility that the
animals would be mistreated after his death.” Id. at 934 n.217.
170
“While the court received more than fifty letters regarding the outcome of this case, none of them addressed
the destruction of a perfectly good Cadillac.” Suzette Daniels, An Introduction to Pet in Wills and Pet Euthanasia,
ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER (2004), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arusdanielssuzette2004.htm
(citing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, In re Estate of Howard H. Brand, (Mar. 17, 1999) available
at http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandorder.pdf).
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See Daniels, supra note 170 (citing Pamela Loring, Horses Await Brand New Life after Rescue From a
Willed Death, HORSIN’ AROUND, 1999).
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Id.
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Id.
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See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Mar. 4, 1999, available at
http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandmemoopp.pdf.
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allow the horses to be killed.175 Instead, it voided the provision stipulating their destruction as
against public policy.176 While acknowledging that the testator’s intentions were to prevent the
animals from suffering after his death by having them humanely euthanized, the court applied
the doctrine of cy pres, and found that the horses could better be saved from inhumane treatment
by saving their lives and letting them be taken in by someone else willing to care for them.177
Similar results were seen in several other American cases and one Canadian case. In In
re Capers Estate,178 a Pennsylvania court found that a willed instruction to destroy two Irish
Setters179 was void “as not being within the purview of the Wills Act of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania” and also as being against the public policy of the commonwealth.180 Instead of
following the testator’s instructions that the animals be killed, the court gave the dogs to the
couple who had been caring for them since her death.181 A California court similarly voided a
testator’s instruction, through a provision in her will, to destroy her pet dog, Sido.182 The court
found that the provision violated public policy and was potentially illegal under California law
(because of specific provisions authorizing conditions under which dogs may be euthanized).183
The court fashioned a remedy where the dog passed under the will’s residuary clause to an
organization called Pets Unlimited, which allowed Sido to stay in its custodial home, subject to
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See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Mar. 17, 1999, available at
http://www.animallaw.info/pleadings/pb_pdf/pbusvtbrandorder.pdf. See also Sykas, supra note 168, at 934.
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34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121 (C.P. Allegheny County 1964).
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& County, June 17, 1980).
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Id.
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inspection by the court.184
A Canadian court voided a similar clause in the will of Clive Wishart, who directed that
after his death his four horses, Barney, Bill, Jack, and King, be “shot by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police and then buried.”185 The RCMP refused to carry out this instruction without a
court order, and the court ultimately declined to give such an order.186 Like the Brand case, there
was a great deal of public outcry against the destruction of the horses, both in the United States
and Canada.187 In refusing to carry out Wishart’s instructions, the court found the provision to
be void as contrary to public policy.188 It also found that the testator’s wishes, which it
determined to be preventing the mistreatment of the horses after his death, could better be
effected by directing the New Brunswick SPCA to find a new home for the horses.189
This last point highlights some of the potential difficulties with cases where courts find
clauses directing animals’ destruction upon the testator’s death void as against public policy. If
the court truly is aiming to find a better way to effect the testator’s intent that the animals not
suffer after his death, it is not clear how far courts are actually willing to go to see that the
animals are in fact properly cared for – for the remainder of their lives.190 In its efforts to address
184

Id. The court made its decision despite being notified that the issue was moot because of legislative action.
“California S. Bill 2059, which included a provision to save Sido specifically, had been unanimously passed and
signed into law before the close of court proceedings.” Waisman & Newell, supra note 39, at 57 n.52.
185
In re Wishart, [1992] 129 N.B.R.2d 397.
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Id. See also Daniels, supra note 170.
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See Wishart, 129 N.B.R. at 402 (discussing the public reaction to the clause of the will); Daniels, supra note
170.
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“It is my conclusion that to destroy Barney, Bill, Jack and King as directed in the Will at this time and in the
present circumstances would be contrary to public policy. The direction in the will is therefore void.” Wishart, 129
N.B.R.2d at 420.
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See Wishart, 129 N.B.R. at 406.
190
This was a point that arose with some emphasis in a discussion of these cases with a group of veterinarians at
Intern-Resident Rounds at the University of Pennsylvania Veterinary School on May 17, 2005. A number of the
veterinarians present expressed concern at the courts’ intervention and argued that courts should only prevent such
killings if they are prepared to insure the animals’ proper care for the rest of their lives. A similar sentiment can be
seen in the opposition of the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) to the American Horse Slaughter
Prevention Act (AHSPA), a proposed federal bill that would prohibit the selling of horses for slaughter. While one
might expect the AVMA to support such a bill, they explain their opposition in the following way: “The AVMA and
AAEP recognize that the processing of unwanted horses is currently a necessary aspect of the equine industry, and
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these concerns, the Canadian court set out the following conditions for the disposition of the
horses:
(1) Prior inspection and approval by the New Brunswick S.P.C.A.;
(2) A written agreement between the Estate and the New Brunswick S.P.C.A. and
the new owner or owners that he, she or it will cooperate with the New Brunswick
S.P.C.A. after acquiring ownership, which agreement will include:
(a) Permission for regular inspection of the horses . . . ;
(b) An undertaking to provide and pay for veterinary services . . . ;
(c) An undertaking to properly feed and care for the horse or horses in
accord with accepted practices and not to abuse the horse or horses;
(d) Such other reasonable conditions as the parties may agree upon and the
Court approve to ensure that the horses are not abused . . . .191
By setting out these conditions, the Wishart court recognizes that in order to properly
carry out the testator’s intent, the horses must be taken care of properly for the remainder of their
lives. It is not clear, however, to what extent the Brand court took the rest of the horses’ lives
into account in deciding who would care for them after it voided the testator’s instruction to have
them humanely euthanized. No such concerns arise, of course, in the disposition of inanimate
property upon a testator’s death, further highlighting distinctions between these different types of
“property.”
If the courts in these cases were right, and the testators’ true intent was to prevent
mistreatment of their animals, then testators (and, arguably, their animals) are better served if
they can make these choices directly. For many years, there was no way to enforce a will
provides a humane alternative to allowing the horse to continue a life of discomfort and pain, and possibly
inadequate care or abandonment.” See American Veterinary Medical Ass’n, AVMA Legislative Alerts and Updates,
http://www.capwiz.com/avma/issues/alert/?alertid=7130716&type=CO (last visited Sept. 26, 2005). The
organization further states that it will not support the legislation unless it adequately addresses the issue of animal
welfare:
The AHSPA does not address the welfare of horses that will not be slaughtered. Many of these
unwanted horses will be donated to horse rescue and retirement facilities, which are not regulated
by any governmental body. While many of these facilities are well run, regulations must be put in
place to establish standards of care to ensure the humane care of these unwanted horses.
Id.
191
Wishart, 129 N.B.R.2d at 421-22.
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provision to assure that an animal was properly cared for after its owner’s death. In recent years,
however, a better way of assuring an animal’s care after its owner’s death has come about, a
legislative solution that allows for the creation of binding trusts to insure an animal’s proper care.
b. Legislation creating binding pet trusts.
For many years, people who wished to provide for their animals after their death had no
way of insuring that such provisions would be carried out. Property could not be left directly to
an animal, and attempts to create trusts to benefit an animal could not be guaranteed success. In
an historical section of his 2000 article, Pet Animals: What Happens When Their Owners Die,
Gerry Beyer sets out the numerous ways “courts have frustrated an owner’s intent to provide
long-term care for the pet after the owner’s death.”192 These include findings that gifts to care
for specific animals were not charitable, and therefore not enforceable;193 finding that such gifts
violated the rule against perpetuities (because an animal’s life could not count as the “measuring
life” to satisfy the Rule’s requirement that the gift vest no later than twenty-one years after the
death of a measuring life);194 finding the amount of money left to care for the animals to be
excessive and therefore reducing those amounts;195 and finding that a testator failed to select a
proper legal mechanism to transfer the funds for the animal’s care.196
Testators’ wishes to care for their pets had a better chance of being realized once courts
began recognizing and permitting honorary trusts to provide for pets.197 However, because these
trusts were honorary, and therefore not enforceable, there was no way of guaranteeing that their
provisions would actually be carried out. “Since these trustees were permitted to exercise an
192
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enormous amount of discretion, the recipient pets were completely at their mercy. The courts
did not step in to enforce the provisions and ensure that trustee was properly caring for the
animals.”198
Recent statutory changes have removed this uncertainty in many jurisdictions. While a
few statutes that allow the creation trusts for the care of pets still only recognize honorary
trusts,199 many other state laws recognize enforceable pet trusts. Such recognition initially came
with the adoption of Section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate Code (UPC), which provides for the
enforcement of a pet trust by “an individual designated for that purpose in the trust instrument or,
if none, by an individual appointed by a court upon application to it by an individual.”200 In
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Daniels, supra note 170.
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15212 (West Supp. 2005) (“A trust for the care of a designated domestic or pet
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WIS. STAT. ANN. § 701.11 (West 2002) (“where the owner of property makes a testamentary transfer in trust for a
specific noncharitable purpose, and there is no definite or definitely ascertainable human beneficiary designated, no
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recent state laws has veered away from this approach, as two states (Missouri and Tennessee) that had originally
enacted honorary trust statutes have recently enacted versions of the UTC §408.”
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(2) Upon termination, the trustee shall transfer the unexpended trust property in the
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adding this section, the drafters recognized the “concern of many pet owners by providing them a
means for leaving funds to be used for the pet’s care.”201 There is a similar provision in section
408 of the Uniform Trust Code: a pet trust may be enforced by “a person appointed in the terms
of the trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court.”202 The
comments to this section go on to clarify its meaning:
Section 110(b) grants to the person appointed the rights of a qualified beneficiary
for the purpose of receiving notices and providing consents. If the trust is created
for the care of an animal, a person with an interest in the welfare of the animal has
standing to petition for an appointment. The person appointed by the court to
enforce the trust should also be a person who has exhibited an interest in the
animal’s welfare. The concept of granting standing to a person with a
demonstrated interest in the animal’s welfare is derived from the Uniform
(3) For the purposes of Section 2-707, the residuary clause is treated as creating a future
interest under the terms of a trust.
(4) The intended use of the principal or income can be enforced by an individual designated
for that purpose in the trust instrument or, if none, by an individual appointed by a court upon
application to it by an individual.
(5) Except as ordered by the court or required by the trust instrument, no filing, report,
registration, periodic accounting, separate maintenance of funds, appointment, or fee is required
by reason of the existence of the fiduciary relationship of the trustee.
(6) A court may reduce the amount of the property transferred, if it determines that that
amount substantially exceeds the amount required for the intended use. The amount of the
reduction, if any, passes as unexpended trust property under subsection (c)(2).
(7) If no trustee is designated or no designated trustee is willing or able to serve, a court shall
name a trustee. A court may order the transfer of the property to another trustee, if required to
assure that the intended use is carried out and if no successor trustee is designated in the trust
instrument or if no designated successor trustee agrees to serve or is able to serve. A court may
also make such other orders and determinations as shall be advisable to carry out the intent of the
transferor and the purpose of this section.]
Id. § 2-907.
201
U.P.C. § 2-907 cmt.
202
U.T.C. § 408(b) (2003), as originally promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 2000 and last amended in 2003. See U.T.C. § 408. Trust For Care Of Animal:
(a) A trust may be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor’s
lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide
for the care of more than one animal alive during the settlor’s lifetime, upon the death of the last
surviving animal.
(b) A trust authorized by this section may be enforced by a person appointed in the terms of
the trust or, if no person is so appointed, by a person appointed by the court. A person having an
interest in the welfare of the animal may request the court to appoint a person to enforce the trust
or to remove a person appointed.
(c) Property of a trust authorized by this section may be applied only to its intended use,
except to the extent the court determines that the value of the trust property exceeds the amount
required for the intended use. Except as otherwise provided in the terms of the trust, property not
required for the intended use must be distributed to the settlor, if then living, otherwise to the
settlor’s successors in interest.
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Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act, which allows a person interested in
the welfare of a ward or protected person to file petitions on behalf of the ward or
protected person.203
The parallels that this comment draws between persons interested in the welfare of a
human ward and persons interested in an animal’s welfare make clear that this law treats animals
very differently from inanimate property. In fact, this provision comes closer than any currently
codified law to giving the animals it covers a status that is similar to that of persons. These laws
that create binding pet trusts have thus gone a long way toward recognizing a new status for
companion animals.
A total of twenty-six states now have statutes that authorize the creation of binding pet
trusts.204 Nine of these states have chosen to enact Section 2-907 of the Uniform Probate
Code;205 ten states have adopted a version of the more recent Uniform Trust Code (UTC)
§408;206 and seven others that have not adopted either of the uniform codes have opted to enforce
pet trusts through independent statutes.207
In addition to these increased legal protections, there are numerous resources to help pet
owners provide for their animals care after their death. One organization, The Estate Planning
for Pets Foundation, offers a website containing “information resources for conscientious pet
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(LexisNexis 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-408 (Supp. 2004); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-409 (2005).
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States with independent versions of pet trusts: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 737.116 (West 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. §
633.2105 (West 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:11-38 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1
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owners and professionals who assist them.”208 The site offers a range of resources, including
links “for pet owners,” “for lawyers,” and “for skeptics,” a legal primer, sample language for pet
trusts, links to the relevant statutes in each state, information on tax considerations, and methods
for calculating funds needed for caretaking.209 Another, Pet Guardian, offers its “PetGuardian
plan,” which provides a pet trust document, a cost analysis to help determine how much to set
aside for pets, a set of sample pet care instructions, and emergency identification cards to be
posted at home and kept in wallets.210 In addition, this organization has teamed up with Best
Friends, a large animal sanctuary in Kanab, Utah to provide what they call “The Best Friends
“backup” service,” which helps to locate alternate caregivers in cases where the originally
designated caregivers become unavailable.211
Similar resources are now being offered by a number of veterinary schools. The School
of Veterinary Medicine at U.C. Davis recently began offering a program called “Tender Loving
Care for Pets” through its Center for Animal in Society.212 This program gives animal owners—
through a bequest to the vet school—assurance that their pet will be placed in a “permanent
loving home” and will receive life-time health care at the school’s veterinary hospital if the
owner predeceases her pet.213 The program promises to “identify and monitor new homes for
enrolled pets.”214 The Veterinary School at Texas A&M University goes even further, providing
an on-campus “Companion Animal Life-Care Center” which “provides the physical, emotional,
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and medical needs of companion animals whose owners are no longer able to provide that
care.”215 According to the center’s web site, its clients include those who predecease their pet.216
In addition to its full-time staff, the center houses veterinary students who “live on site to ensure
24 hour care and company for our residents.”217 Resources such as these make clear the
perceived need to help pet owners provide for their pets’ care after their death. The proliferation
of not only the laws providing for binding pet trusts, but these resources that take advantage of
those laws, makes clear just how large that need may be.
4.

Increased Penalties and Protections in Animal Cruelty Statutes

Criminal laws prohibiting cruelty to animals—which includes both abuse and neglect—
have provided the primary way in which our legal system has protected animals.218 These
enactments highlight one of the few ways in which the law has traditionally treated animals
differently from other forms of property, and perhaps has not treated them as “property” at all.
State anti-cruelty statutes, by some accounts, are older than our country219 and date back at least
as far as the time of the civil war.220 At the federal level, animal protection law is more recent.
The Animal Welfare Act was enacted in 1966, and it has been amended several times since then
to strengthen some of the protections of the animals that it covers.221
The Animal Welfare Act is fairly limited in scope. The law aims to insure the humane
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treatment of animals used in research, for exhibition purposes, or as pets.222 But its regulation on
research only applies to certain warm-blooded animals; it excludes farm animals and only
applies to horses if they are used for research purposes.223 One provision of the Animal Welfare
Act, known as the “pet theft act,” sets out a series of rules that aim to prevent pet animals from
being stolen and sold for research.224
Historically, state anti-cruelty laws have been similarly limited. In the past, both state and
federal laws prohibiting cruelty to animals have been criticized for their limited coverage,
insufficient penalties, numerous exemptions, and low enforcement rates.225
What is notable about the state animal cruelty laws, however, is the extent to which they
have been strengthened in the past decade or so. As recently as 1993, almost all state animal
cruelty laws provided for offenses that were, at most, misdemeanors. Only seven states at that
time had felony animal abuse laws on their books.226 By 1999, twenty-three states had at least
one form of felony law for animal abuse.227 As of the end of 2004, a total of forty-one states and
the District of Columbia consider at least some types of animal abuse a felony.228 In addition to
increasing penalties, state animal cruelty statutes have strengthened their reach by expanding the
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definition of animals covered by the statute; increasing the range of offenses to include, for
example, animal fighting and ear-cropping of dogs.229 Many states have amended their statutes
to allow courts to impose additional penalties, such as requiring reimbursement for the cost of
caring for the injured animal, requiring behavioral counseling, and seizing the animals that are
being mistreated or neglected. Courts may also enjoin defendants from owning animals during a
probation period, and some may even order defendants to forfeit their right to possess animals in
the future.
State anti-cruelty statutes not only prohibit abusive treatment of animals, many state
laws additionally impose affirmative duties on people who care for animals.230 California law,
example, makes it a misdemeanor for an owner to permit the animal to be without “proper care
and attention.”231 Another provision requires animal depositaries to “provide the animals with
necessary and prompt veterinary care, nutrition, and shelter, and treat them kindly.”232 While the
“treat them kindly” provision may be unique to California, laws imposing affirmative duties for
proper housing, veterinary care, and feeding of animals are becoming increasingly common.233
Another interesting feature of the state anti-cruelty laws is how much their coverage can
vary by state. Unlike the area of enforceable pet trusts, where most state laws are adopted either
from the Uniform Probate Code or Uniform Trust Code, there is no Uniform Law of animal
protection. Rather, each state has its own unique statute prohibiting cruelty to animals, and while
there may be some commonalities among these statutes, there are also important differences in
the acts prohibited, animals covered, penalties, and exemptions. Thus, in addition to the limited
229
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protections of the Animal Welfare Act, which apply across all states, individual states, through
their own animal cruelty statutes, are able to provide protections that can respond to the unique
needs of that state. In Tennessee, for example, the crime of cruelty to animals includes
“inflict[ing] burns, cuts, lacerations, or other injuries or pain, by any method, including blistering
compounds, to the legs or hooves of horses . . . .”234 This provision is a specific response to the
local practice of “soring” (as in “making sore”), in various ways, the feet of Tennessee Walking
Horses to exaggerate the high-stepping gait for which these horses are valued.235
State law prohibiting animal cruelty is extremely dynamic. In addition to the many
changes seen in the past decade, many more are in the works. In a number of jurisdictions,
numerous proposed bills which are pending which would further strengthen the animal cruelty
laws. In Pennsylvania, for example, the current law applies harsher penalties for harm to dogs
and cats than to other animals, whether the animal belongs to the offender or someone else.236
One proposed amendment would apply these penalties to certain forms of cruelty to any animal,
not just dogs and cats.237 Another pending bill would further increase penalties for harm to a
guide dog.238 Similar proposals are pending in many other jurisdictions.
Several features of newly enhanced animal cruelty statutes are worth noting because they
resemble, in some ways, features of laws prohibiting child abuse. Such provisions provide
another indication that animals are being treated less like property, or at least less like inanimate
forms of property. In 1999, there were nine states that either required the reporting of animal
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abuse or provided immunity for veterinarians who report such abuse.239 Currently ten states
have such features in their laws.240 Such reporting features, especially in states where reporting
is mandated, are notable in the way they resemble child abuse reporting statutes. Another feature
of interest is the potential for court-ordered counseling for offenders. At least sixteen states have
provisions in their animal cruelty statutes that allow courts to order offenders to undergo
psychological or behavioral counseling.241 These provisions recognize that people who abuse
animals are not only at risk to do so again, but are also more likely to engage in violent crimes
against people. Provisions that allow courts to mandate counseling are aimed at preventing both
types of abuse.
Another way in which animal cruelty laws are recognizing the connection between
violence toward animals and violence toward people is by including provisions such as those in a
2001 amendment to the Oregon animal cruelty statute.242 This amendment allows for increased
penalties for those convicted of animal cruelty if the offender has a prior conviction of animal
abuse, domestic violence, or an offense committed against a minor child.243 The provision also
allows for increased penalties for offenders who knowingly commit the animal abuse in the
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presence of a minor child.244 The Oregon statute, therefore, not only ties animal abuse together
with domestic violence and child abuse, but it appears to create a special category of abuse that
bridges both animal abuse and child abuse: animal abuse in the presence of a child.
State cruelty laws, at a minimum, recognize that animals have the capacity to suffer, and
these laws seek to reduce that suffering. In states where a particular type of animal suffering is
prevalent, such as the abuse of Tennessee Walking Horses, state laws are increasingly
recognizing and specifically prohibiting that form of abuse. And in a number of states, the
animal cruelty laws recognize a connection between abusing animals and abusing people.
Looking together at these various features of anti-cruelty leads to an unmistakable conclusion:
the ways in which such laws protect animals goes a long way towards recognizing a legal status
of animals that is significantly different from that of other things that the law considers property.
5.

Language Shift from “Owner” to “Guardian”

There is one additional statutory change that is worth noting, although its significance is
more symbolic than legally meaningful. One state law and twelve local ordinances have
changed the language describing the relationship between people and their animals from “owner”
to “guardian.”245 Some of these laws, such as Rhode Island’s state law on animal cruelty, have
actually supplemented, rather than replaced “owner” terminology with the word “guardian.”246
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And as the statute makes clear, this language change does not change in any way a person’s legal
obligations to her animals:
“Guardian” shall mean a person(s) having the same rights and responsibilities of
an owner, and both terms shall be used interchangeably. A guardian shall also
mean a person who possesses, has title to or an interest in, harbors or has control,
custody or possession of an animal and who is responsible for an animal’s safety
and well-being.247
Although Rhode Island is the only state to have made such a change to its animal protection
laws, there are a total of twelve cities or towns – including Boulder, Colorado; Berkeley, West
Hollywood, and San Francisco, California; St. Louis, Missouri; and Woodstock, New York –
that have enacted similar language changes.248
While it appears that these language changes have no real legal effect,249 the laws have
generated a good deal of controversy, and two sides have emerged, staking out opposing
positions. Proponents hope that by changing the legal language from owner to guardian, the
attitudes and understanding about our responsibilities to animals will change for the better.250
Those who promoted such laws hope that they will serve an educational role, and will help
people to see that they have greater responsibilities to their pets than to other property that they
own, even though these laws do not actually change animals’ status to something other than
property.251 Groups that oppose such language changes, including a number of veterinary
groups, claim that such changes threaten to undermine, rather than strengthen, the relationship
between people and their pets.252 They claim, for example, that pet “guardians” might be faced
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with more limited health care choices for their pets, and that veterinarians might have trouble
clarifying who should be making the choices regarding an animal’s care.253 Codifying this
opposition, the American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) – the veterinary equivalent
of the AMA – has adopted an official position statement against such terminology changes.
Approved by their executive board in May 2003, their resolution reads as follows:
Ownership vs. Guardianship
The American Veterinary Medical Association promotes the optimal health and
well-being of animals. Further, the AVMA recognizes the role of responsible
owners in providing for their animals’ care. Any change in terminology
describing the relationship between animals and owners does not strengthen this
relationship and may, in fact, diminish it. Such changes in terminology may
decrease the ability of veterinarians to provide services and, ultimately, result in
animal suffering.254
The AVMA may have additional concerns with the implications of the changes in terminology
for their member veterinarians that are not expressed in their official position statement. Similar
opposition has been expressed by the American Veterinary Medical Law Association (AVMLA),
whose “White Paper” raises numerous legal concerns that could arise for veterinarians if their
clients become guardians rather than owners of animals.255
Pressure from groups such as the AVMA and AVMLA was presumably behind a
resolution recently adopted by the Council of State Governments (CSG) Governing Boards,
which sets out its opposition to “legislation that reclassifies pet, livestock or animal owners as
guardians or that otherwise alters the legal status of animals . . . .”256 The reasons the CSG gives
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for its resolution include a claim that such statutes would limit owners’ freedom of choice in
caring for their animals, permit third parties to petition for a pet’s custody, permit a legal
challenge to treatment choices of owners and veterinarians, and generally threaten the legal
balance between the rights of pet owners and the well-being of animals.257 This resolution was
adopted in September of 2004. Given its adoption, it is unlikely that many states will be
following Rhode Island’s lead in supplementing or changing the language of animal “owner” to
that of animal “guardian.”258
It may seem curious that there is so much organized opposition to a change in language
that has no current legal effect. At first blush, one might expect veterinarians who treat
companion animals to embrace such language. The concerns regarding the use of the term
“guardian” for pet owners appear to center around fears of where such language could lead. And
it is this fear that has generated opposition from groups of veterinarians, researchers, and state
legislators against the “potentially enormous legal implications”259 of what many proponents see
as a simple language change to help better educate the public about responsibilities toward pets.
Proponents want to see more responsible pet ownership, while opponents seem to fear the
implications of moving toward personhood status for pets. The problem seems to lie in the
potential legal implications of a term – guardian – that already carries a legally significant
meaning.260 Because of what the term “guardian” implies in relationships between people,261
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those who take a more conservative approach to any changes in the legal status of pets fear the
implications of legislating the use of this term to describe pet owners.
Educating pet owners about their responsibilities appears to be a laudable goal and
certainly not a controversial one. If that goal is going to be accomplished through changes in
statutory language or other changes to the legal status of pets, it needs to be done through a new
legal category and through terminology that is not already fraught with legal meaning that will
raise the concerns and fears of people who work with animals. The next section of this article
proposes just such a category.
Part IV: The Above Described Legal Changes Should Be Formally
Recognized by Creating a New Legal Category for Companion Animals
As the above sections demonstrate, public attitudes and many of our current laws already
reflect many ways in which non-human animals, and especially companion animals, are treated
fundamentally differently from inanimate property. Cruelty statutes recognize that animals can
suffer from inhumane treatment; more and more states are making such treatment felony
offenses. Many animal protection statutes go even further, imposing a number of affirmative
duties on owners or guardians to care for animals properly. Other laws in areas as diverse as
estates and trusts, marriage dissolution, and tort law are increasingly recognizing a different
status for companion animals by acknowledging the bond that can exist between humans and the
animals they care for. In many states, companion animals can now benefit from enforceable
trusts after an owner’s death; courts are showing an increasing willingness to consider an
animal’s interest in custody decisions; and both courts and legislatures are finding ways of
awarding damages above “fair market value” when a companion animal is killed or injured.
Despite these trends, the differences between animals and inanimate property need to be
and duty to care for another’s person or property”) (emphasis added).
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more clearly reflected in our laws, because there are still too many cases where the results under
current laws are inconsistent with this understanding of companion animals. Many courts
continue to struggle with appropriate damage awards in tort cases. While some recent cases have
seen awards as high as $30,000 on “actual value to owner” theories262, other courts – even those
that seem quite sympathetic to arguments that companion animals are simply different from
other fungible property – feel that their hands are tied by existing laws that define animals as
property.263 Such problems could be alleviated by formally creating a new legal status for
companion animals – a category that recognizes that, while animal are not persons, there are
many reasons for the law to treat them differently from fungible personal property.
A separate legal category for companion animals has both intuitive appeal and would
better reflect the way in which we value companion animals in our society. First, the category
would appeal to the intuitive notion that many judges have expressed: that “[pets occupy] a
special place somewhere in between a person and a piece of personal property,”264 and that the
“property” label “inadequately and inaccurately describes the relationship between a human and
a dog.”265 And there is a tremendous amount of evidence that our society values companion
animals in a way that is fundamentally different from the way we value other property: we spend
large amounts of money on their veterinary care, we give them birthday presents, get them pet
sitters or leave them in “doggie day care,”266 we take them on vacations with us, 267 and we make
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serious efforts to provide for their care after our death.268 An even more vivid reminder of just
how highly people value their animals was demonstrated by all of those who refused to evacuate
Hurricane Katrina-damaged New Orleans without their animals.269 These refusals caused so
many problems that the evacuation policy was quickly changed, and those boarding the buses
evacuating Texas residents as Hurricane Rita approached were allowed to bring their pets
along.270
A legal approach recognizing companion animals as falling somewhere between persons
and inanimate property would be consistent with the most conservative scientific and moral
theories of animals’ status. While there is much disagreement about the extent of animal
intelligence, ability for self-recognition, theory of mind, intentionality, and autonomy,271 no one
seriously argues the capacity of companion animals such as dogs and cats to suffer, or to feel
pain.272 This agreement can in part be seen in the frequency with which is quoted a famous line
of Jeremy Bentham: “the question is not, Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? But, Can they
suffer?”273 Recognizing this capacity to suffer, a capacity that is certainly not shared by
inanimate property, provides another reason to create a distinct legal category for companion
animals.
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A. A New Legal Category: Companion Animal Property
This article proposes the legislative creation of a new status that formally recognizes
companion animals as a distinct legal category: “companion animal property.” This proposal
takes up Judge Andell’s call that “[t]he law should reflect society’s recognition that animals are
sentient and emotive beings that are capable of providing companionship to the humans with
whom they live.”274 The “companion animal property” category would thus take into account
companion animals’ dependence on their human owners, their capacity to suffer if mistreated or
neglected, and the bonds that we form with our animals and that they form with us. The
resulting legal category would clarify, in ways that our current laws do not yet achieve, that we
therefore have certain responsibilities toward our living property that we simply do not have
toward inanimate property.
The companion animal property category acknowledges the capacity for humans to form
strong bonds with their animal companions. Evidence of these bonds is already seen in a number
of ways within the veterinary profession. For example, the amounts of money that people are
willing to spend on treating their companion animals has given rise to the growth of many
specialty areas within the field of small animal medicine.275 And a large number of veterinary
schools now have bereavement programs that help people deal with the loss of their companion
animal.276 Other schools have programs that specifically study the human-animal bond.277
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In addition to recognizing the bonds between humans and animals, formally creating a
new legal category for companion animals leads to more consistency in the law and would help
to make sense of a number of judicial and legislative trends that have been emerging in the past
decade or more. As discussed above, changes are occurring in areas of law as diverse as estates
and trusts, criminal law and tort law. But the changes are happening in an uneven fashion, which
can lead to a variety of anomalous results. Within the same jurisdiction, for example, an animal
might be the subject of an enforceable trust that is funded with a large amount of money, but if
that same animal is negligently killed, its guardian may not be able to recover more than its
minimal market value. In one state, owners of a negligently injured animal might not even be
able to recover veterinary expenses to pay for treatment made necessary by the injury. Yet in
other states, the same owner might be able to recover treatment expenses, along with
compensatory damages for emotional distress and punitive damages.278 Officially recognizing
these changes by creating a legal category for companion animals will lead to more consistency
both within and across these various areas of law.
B. Comparisons to Other Proposals on Animals’ Legal Status
Creating a new legal category for companion animals that treats them as an enhanced
type of property – one that recognizes their important differences from inanimate property –
would likely gain greater acceptance and avoid much of the controversy generated by other
proposals that can be grouped into the “animal rights” camp. The most controversial of these
proposals are those that aim to completely change the property status of animals, seeking instead
277
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a form of legal “personhood” for animals.279 Less controversial proposals range from one that
would create a different type of property status where animals retain an “equitable selfownership” in their own title,280 to an argument that animal rights already exist, but they need to
be better enforced by allowing actions by private citizens and by animals represented by human
beings.281
A number of commentators would eliminate animals’ property status altogether and grant
them a legal status akin to personhood. Steven Wise asserts that humans enjoy rights that are not
available to nonhuman animals because of “speciesism,” discrimination against other animal
species that cannot be justified by any meaningful differences between humans and other
animals.282 Instead, he sets out a quality that he calls “practical autonomy,”283 which he argues is
sufficient to entitle any species to basic liberty rights.284 Gary Francione also advocates for
eliminating the property status of animals and granting them legal personhood.285 Francione
rejects any compromise proposals that retain animals’ legal status as property.286 He advocates
extending to animals “the right not to be property” and sees the only other option to be making
them moral persons.287 Francione agrees with Wise that it is unjustifiable speciesism, rather than
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any morally justifiable difference, that accounts for the property status of nonhuman animals.288
David Favre takes issue with animal activists like Wise and Francione who want to
eliminate animals’ property status, claiming that such a stance is both unwise and unnecessary.289
Favre not only sees such a change in the status of animals as highly unlikely, he also believes
that such a change is a bad idea, especially if it leads to the elimination of domestic animals.290
And he thinks that eliminating property status is unnecessary because he sees another way to
achieve improvement in the legal status of animals: by retaining animals’ status as property but
dividing their title into legal and equitable components, creating a form of self-ownership that he
calls “equitable self-ownership.”291 With his proposal, Favre hopes to “shift the nature of the
relationship between the owner and the animal from that which is like the ownership of [a] rock
to that which is more like, but not identical to, the custodial relationship of the human parent and
the human child.”292 Favre hopes to achieve this goal by blending the previously separated
categories of property ownership and juristic persons.293 He envisions that this new status will
lead to changes in the legal obligations that humans have to the animals in their care, and that the
nature of these duties will arise primarily from two sources: animal protection (anti-cruelty)
statutes and legal concepts that define the relationship between parents and children.294
Cass Sunstein’s approach is similar in some respects to Favre’s. Sunstein argues that
animals already enjoy many rights, if we understand “rights” to mean legal protections against
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harm.295 State anti-cruelty laws, along with the federal laws such as the Animal Welfare Act,
provide these rights to animals.296 Sunstein, like Favre, thus focuses on the role of existing laws
to provide protections for animals. The problem is not that animals lack protections or rights, but
that these rights are not adequately enforced.297 Sunstein proposes closing this “enforcement
gap” by allowing private parties to bring actions directly against those who violate state or
federal laws.298 He additionally advocates allowing animals to bring suits against such violators
through human representatives.299 Animals’ status can best be improved by improving
enforcement of their existing rights. Sunstein is less concerned over whether animals are
classified as property or persons and more concerned with the specific rights and duties that such
labeling might suggest.300
C. A Suggested Starting Point to Defining Companion Animal Property
The goal of this section is to suggest a starting point for defining the new legal category,
“companion animal property.”301 The hope is that the ideas proposed here will begin a
conversation of how the legal status of companion animals can be changed incrementally to
better recognize the bonds between humans and their companion animals, to continue legal
trends that have already begun, and to gain broader acceptance than the proposals that would
grant personhood status to animals.
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This article’s proposal of creating a legal category of “companion animal property”
would, like Sunstein’s proposal, retain the property status of animals and not take on the battle of
changing their status to one approaching that of persons. The proposal advocates an incremental
change in the legal status of companion animals to more accurately reflect the direction that our
laws, especially the recent developments in trust law,302 are going.
There are a number of ways to define and limit the companion animal property category
so as to avoid various parade-of-horrors scenarios303 put forth by those who object to anything
that smacks of “animal rights.”304 One limitation would focus on the animal’s role and its
relationship with its human owner or guardian. Such a limitation can be found in Carolyn
Matlack’s proposed legal category for companion animals that she calls “sentient property.”305
Matlack, an attorney who is the president and managing editor of Animal Legal Report Services,
sets forth her “sentient property” category as a compromise on the legal status of pets that would
recognize them as living, feeling companions but would not give them anything approaching the
rights of persons.306 Matlack defines sentient property as “any warm blooded, domesticated
nonhuman animal dependent on one or more humans for food, shelter, veterinary care, or
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compassion and typically kept in or near the household of its owner, guardian, or keeper.”307
Her definition thus focuses on the animal’s dependence on its owner and the closeness of its
living arrangements. The only limitation on the type of animal would be that it is warm-blooded
and domesticated.
This article proposes a companion animal property category that would be even more
limited. First, it would focus on the animal’s role and would clarify that the category only
applies to companion animals, or pets, and not to domesticated farm animals that might live near
their owner’s home. Second, instead of applying to any warm-blooded animal, this category
would limit, by species, the types of animals to which it would apply. As a starting point, the
category would be limited to animals that are typically kept as pets: dogs and cats.308 While this
new legal category would begin with this very narrowly defined class of animals, it might also be
reasonable to set out ways in which the definition could start with a presumption that it only
applies to dogs and cats, but allow for evidence that other animals could qualify as companion
animals if certain criteria were met.309 Additional companion animals might include backyard
horses, parrots and other tropical birds, “pocket pets,” such as ferrets, guinea pigs, hamsters,
rabbits, and pot-bellied pigs.
Once this new category is defined by the animals to which it would apply, its legal effect
needs to be shaped. In many ways, this category would simply conform to legal trends that have
already occurred in areas of animal cruelty law and estates law. In other ways, and in other areas
of law, the category would have additional legal effects of its own. Statutes that make cruelty to
307
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animals a criminal offense, that create affirmative duties to the animals we keep in our homes,
and that allow us to leave enforceable trusts to our pets already recognize that these animals are
in a different legal category from inanimate property, even if that category has not yet been
named. The companion animal property category would encourage these legal trends to continue
and would provide a more rational terminology to support these trends in the law.
The new category will create additional legal effects in areas such as tort law, lost and
found animal disputes, and custody upon marriage dissolution. Courts would no longer need to
be constrained by the “mere property” label in awarding damages that recognize the bond
between people and their companion animals.310 Decisions about who gets custody of a lost and
found animal would be based on principles that are not about property ownership, but would
rather look at who has formed a closer bond to the animal, or who can provide a better home for
it. Following the lead of the Vermont Supreme Court,311 these decisions could take into account
the importance of encouraging finders of lost animals to care for and develop relationships with
them. And custody awards could take into account the animal’s attachment to each spouse and
the animal’s best interest, avoiding decisions such as the recent Pennsylvania one denying a
visitation and shared custody request because it was “analogous, in law, to a visitation schedule
for a table or a lamp.”312
D. Should Courts or Legislatures Enact Changes to Animals’ Legal Status?
A debate exists among those who advocate changing the legal status of animals about
whether such changes ought to be judicially or legislatively enacted.313 Matlack, for example,
presents her “sentient property” proposal as a compromise for judges who want to move beyond
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laws that treat animals as inanimate property.314 Other commentators have suggested various
options for legislative change.315 While the notion of incremental judge-made changes has
certain appeal, experience has shown that such change with regards to the status of animal
happens slowly, if at all. A number of judges who seemed to be open to the idea of such changes
have nevertheless claimed to be constrained by precedent; some have directly deferred to the
legislature to enact them.316 For this and other reasons, legislative change seems to make the
most sense. The experience with legislatively enacted enforceable trusts and with legislation that
increases animal cruelty offenses to felonies shows that legislation protecting the interests of
companion animals can be effective.
Another reason to favor legislative change is that the legislation can at the same time
address the concerns of those who seem most opposed to any formal change in the legal status of
animals. There has been some organized opposition to changing the legal status of animals by
the veterinary community, much of which seems to be driven by malpractice concerns. If the
source of this opposition can be alleviated by addressing the fear of increased malpractice
premiums by including caps on damage awards in any legislative change, then perhaps much of
the opposition would dissipate. Similarly, the opposition to change that has come from the
research community317 would likely be alleviated if changes to the status of companion animals
were narrowly defined in a way that did not affect their research interests. Limiting the animals
314
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to which such changes would apply both by species and by their roles in the lives of humans
would respond, at least in part, to many of the concerns raised by the research community.318
One obstacle to legislative change that might be difficult to overcome is the Council of
State Government’s recently adopted Resolution on Animal Guardianship and Liability
Legislation.319 Asserting that the proper balance between responsible animal care and the rights
of pet owners and livestock producers can already be found within the existing legal framework,
and that this balance is being threatened by those who want to give personhood rights to animals
and who advocate for the recovery of non-economic damages in tort cases involving injured
animals, the Council formally opposes two types of legislative change: (1) “legislation that
reclassifies pet, livestock or animal owners as guardians or that otherwise alters the legal status
of the animals,” and (2) “legislation permitting the recovery of non-economic damages for the
loss or injury of a pet, livestock or other animal.”320
Given their stated opposition to any legislation that “alters the legal status of animals,” it
is hard to imagine this group not opposing the creation of a legal category, companion animal
property. It would be important to present the proposal as one that does not really effect actual
change, but merely codifies changes that are already occurring. In fact, the argument would go,
these are the very changes that have created the current “healthy balance”321 between the rights
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of animals and the rights of those who care for them. Formally creating a category for
companion animal property would help to ensure that we do not return to the time when
companion animals were more likely to be viewed as fungible, throw-away property, when
penalties for animal abuse were less harsh and even less likely to be enforced.
Overcoming opposition to legislative change will not necessarily be easy. But if the
legislation can be tailored to address the major concerns of those who are most likely to oppose
it, and its passage can be presented as a logical next step in protecting the interests of animals
and reflecting the values of those who care for and work with them, then the creation of the legal
category companion animal property might be feasible. And contrasting this proposal with those
that would go much farther in extending rights to animals could help to garner additional
support.
E. Effects of Additional Distinctions Between and Within Species
Defining the legal category companion animal property both by types of animal and by
the animal’s role could admittedly create additional distinctions both between and within animal
species. But it is important to realize that such distinctions have always existed in our laws
protecting animals, and it is likely that they always will. There are good reasons for many of the
legal differences that exist between animal species.322 The differences that exist based on how
we use the animals323 may be harder to justify, but they are a reality of our current legal system
that are unlikely to change anytime soon.
Many current laws already treat animals differently by species. The federal Animal
Welfare Act, for example, regulates the use of animals in research, the commercial sale and
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transportation of animals, and exhibition of animals.324 These animal protection provisions,
however, only apply to certain warm-blooded animals; all farm animals are exempted.325 Horses
are covered by the Act, but only if they are used for research purposes. Another provision of the
Act, known as the “pet theft act” aims to prevent pet animals being stolen and sold for research.
These sections only apply to dogs and cats.326 This law, therefore, makes clear distinctions
among animal species, and, in the case of horses, by how the animal is used.
Different treatment of animals can also be seen in a number of states’ animal cruelty
statutes. In Pennsylvania, for example, recent amendments to the animal protection law apply
harsher penalties for harm to dogs and cats, whether the animal belongs to the offender or
someone else.327 While some would propose applying these increased penalties to all animals,
one specific proposed bill would further increase penalties for harm to a guide dog,328 not only
maintaining the distinction by species, but adding an additional distinction based on how the
animal is used.
Most of the recent changes in the law apply only to cases of companion animals.
Creating a legal category to codify those changes would additionally codify the different
treatment of animals both between and within species. And, while some judges have expressed
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concern about creating additional distinctions both within and between species,329 many courts,
legislatures,330 and commentators331 accept both the need for and the inevitability of such
distinctions.332 Thus the additional distinctions that this new category would create between and
within species should not stand in the way of moving forward with these legal changes.
Part V: The Impact of a New Legal Status for
Companion Animals on the Veterinary Profession
This section explores the implications that the creation of a new legal category,
companion animal property, might have on the veterinary profession. Since there has already
been some organized opposition in the veterinary community to changing the legal status of
animals,333 and since strong veterinary opposition is likely to impede any real change in this
area,334 it is important to look at how such a change might actually affect veterinarians. This
group would be less inclined to oppose such changes, and might even support them, if it sees that
it is ultimately in the best interests of the profession to raise the status of companion animals
329
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above that of inanimate property.
Certainly, changes in the way we value companion animals in our society are already
having both positive and negative impacts on the profession. Owners of companion animals are
more likely to spend money on both preventative and curative veterinary care, and this increased
willingness has helped to support the increased specialization in veterinary medicine.335 But
such owners are also more likely to have higher expectations for what veterinary medicine can
accomplish, and they may be more likely to bring a malpractice claim if they are unhappy with
the outcome.336 The profession will continue to experience these effects whether or not the legal
status of companion animals changes. This section will address the ways in which changing the
law to reflect society’s changing values may affect veterinary medicine and education in ways
that that go beyond the changes in societal values themselves.
A. Veterinary Opposition to Changing the Legal Status of Animals
The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) has expressed its opposition to
changes in the legal status of animals in several position statements and resolutions. As
discussed in Section III(B)(5) above, the AVMA adopted a resolution in 2003 opposing any
legislation that changes from “owner” to “guardian” the terminology describing a person’s
relationship with her animals.337 The resolution claims that such change could weaken
individuals’ relationships with their animals, limit veterinarians’ ability to provide services, “and,
ultimately result in animal suffering.”338 And in a 2003 statement setting out the AVMA’s
position on whether damage awards for injured animals should exceed their property value, the
organization declares its support for the legal concept of animals as property, while recognizing
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that “some animals have value to their owners that may exceed the animal’s market value.”339
This statement apparently received limited support from the AVMA Executive Board, passing
only after the Board’s Chair cast a tie-breaking vote.340
Given all that veterinarians have gained, and will continue to gain, from the increased
valuation of pets, it might seem curious that there is so much organized opposition to both
changes in pets’ legal status and to their valuation above fair market value. The most likely
explanation for this opposition seems to lie in the profession’s concerns that increased status and
valuation of animals will lead to an increased exposure to large malpractice awards against
veterinarians.341 Veterinarians seem to be concerned that increasing the status and value of
animals will mean that pet owners are more likely to bring suits when their pets are injured or
killed, and that the amounts of damage awards will continue to increase.342 Both of these
phenomena, they claim, will lead to a rise in malpractice premiums that will either drive them
out of business or will make the cost of veterinary care prohibitive to the average pet owner.343
B. Responses to Veterinary Opposition
There are several responses to this position. One argument is that it is simply
disingenuous for veterinarians, whose profession has achieved so much because of the increased
status of animals, to say that these animals are really just property.344 And the awkwardness of
such a position has not been lost on the veterinary profession itself, as seen in this statement of
veterinarian James Wilson:
339
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Veterinarians must accept that they can no longer promote expenditures of time,
money and emotional energy by owners . . . and then when something goes awry
simply say, “Oh well, tough luck Mrs. Jones. It’s just an animal under the law.
Animals are merely personal property; therefore you may not collect damages for
your loss, other than the market value of your pet.”345
A similar understanding can be found in the charge of a recently approved AVMA task force on
the Legal Status of Animals, which will recommend an AVMA policy position on animals’
status and valuation.346 Apparently meant to update and amend the 2003 resolution and policy
statements discussed above, the task force is charged with looking at both the pros and cons of
non-economic damage awards, determining when such awards are appropriate, and developing a
list of legal protections that would be needed should guardianship laws be applied to animals.347
The creation of the task force was driven, at least in part, by concerns about how the public will
perceive veterinarian opposition to initiatives changing the status and valuation of animals.348
The profession seems rightly concerned that such opposition could easily damage its
credibility.349
Some critics of such veterinary opposition go even further, arguing that veterinarians
have engaged in professional complicity to increase the public’s perceived value of companion
animals, actively promoting the human-animal bond,350 and they are therefore in no position to
deny that such a bond exists when advocating against change in animals’ legal status. Evidence
of the veterinary profession’s recognition of the importance of the human-animal bond can be
seen in the curricula of a number of veterinary schools (some of which have even established
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centers on the human-animal bond), and on the amount of research studying this bond.351
A further argument against such veterinary opposition is that its conclusion – that
increasing animals’ status and value will lead to increased malpractice premiums that will either
drive them out of business or make the cost of veterinary care prohibitive – is based on a faulty
premise. One commentator who has researched and crunched the numbers concludes that the
effect of higher damage awards on malpractice premiums – especially if those awards are subject
to a legislative cap – is likely to be negligible.352 Veterinarians seem to be using the
“malpractice crisis” in human medicine as their guide. But while there is hardly universal
agreement that malpractice has reached crisis proportions in human medicine, there is even less
evidence that such will be the case in veterinary medicine if the valuation or status of companion
animals formally changes.
Finally, returning to this author’s proposal that companion animal property become a
recognized legal category, it is not clear that simply creating such a category will have an effect
on veterinary malpractice separate from the societal values and legal trends that already exist.
The recent cases that have allowed high damage awards for negligent harm to companion
animals have not depended on any change in the animal’s legal status. Courts have shown a
willingness to value this type of property well above its “fair market value” by allowing recovery
of reasonable veterinary expenses (which seems ultimately to be a benefit to the veterinary
profession) and by looking at the animal’s actual value to owner – a valuation that does not
depend on a status different from other property.353
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If veterinary malpractice premiums are in fact destined to rise, the increase will be only
partly attributable to changes in the law. Much of any increase in malpractice may simply be due
to the fact that animal owners are valuing their animal more and expecting more from veterinary
care.354 And if the real concern is increased damages, then any legislative change to companion
animals’ legal status can be accompanied by a cap on damage awards, which will go a long way
toward alleviating any pending veterinary malpractice “crisis.” More importantly, however,
being driven by malpractice concerns seems to be a very short-sighted way to stake out a
position on whether there should be a change in the legal status of animals. Veterinarians would
likely reap numerous other benefits from such changes in status.
C. Potential Benefits to The Veterinary Profession of Changing The Legal Status of
Companion Animals
The formal opposition that veterinarians and veterinary associations have raised to any
change in the legal status of companion animals may say more about how deeply ingrained are
their fears of litigation and the “malpractice crisis” than about how most veterinarians view their
role with regard to the animals they treat. If malpractice concerns were alleviated, with, for
example, legislative caps on damages or other “tort reform” measures that have been proposed
with regard to human medicine, it is likely that many more veterinarians would favor changing
the legal status of companion animals. Veterinarians, particularly the majority who treat
companion animals, have a great deal to gain from a formal recognition that the animals they
treat have a status that is fundamentally different from inanimate property. Such a change would
likely have a positive effect on the professional role of veterinarians, raising both the prestige of
the veterinary profession and the remuneration of practitioners; it would lead to more
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consistency both in the way that veterinarians view themselves as professionals and with the
realities of their practice; and it would help to eliminate many of the problems they can face
when their professional judgment is constrained by the sometimes irrational choices of animal
owners.
The veterinarian’s professional role has been described as being somewhere along a
spectrum that compares the veterinarian’s role, on one end, to that of the garage mechanic, and
on the other end, to a pediatrician.355 This garage mechanic vs. pediatrician model has been set
out by Bernard Rollin, a philosopher who teaches Veterinary Ethics at Colorado State Veterinary
School.356 As Rollin explains the choices:
If a person brings a car to a mechanic and the mechanic determines that the
vehicle will cost five thousand dollars to repair, it is perfectly permissible for the
owner to declare “Five thousand dollars? The hell with it! Junk it!” On the other
hand, if a parent brings a child to a pediatrician and the physician determines that
the child needs five thousand dollars’ worth of surgery, the pediatrician certainly
doesn’t allow the parent to say, “The hell with the kid! Junk ‘em! I can make
another one.”357
The reality of course, is that veterinarians are neither garage mechanics nor pediatricians. Their
professional role is somewhere in between these two extremes, and where on the spectrum it falls
may depend on the nature of their practice.358 The point of Rollin’s analogy, however, is clear.
As society’s view of companion animals’ status increases, and as more pet owners view their
animals like members of the family, the more appropriate the pediatrician model seems. But our
current laws that view animals as simply another form of personal property are more in line with
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the garage mechanic model.359 The profession stands to gain in a number of ways if
veterinarians are treated more like pediatricians.
Raising the legal status of companion animals to something more valued than inanimate
property can raise the prestige of the veterinary profession in a number of ways. Veterinary
training is similar, in many respects, to medical training.360 In fact, there are many ways in
which veterinarians see themselves as more skilled than physicians who practice human
medicine: physicians, unlike veterinarians, only need to know how to treat one species, and it is
harder to get into a veterinary school than to get into medical school. Despite these differences,
salaries of veterinarians lag well behind those of physicians, which fact likely has much to do
with the legal status of the “patients” they treat. If this status were to change, even
incrementally, the prestige and remuneration of veterinarians would likely improve.
A similar improvement was seen in both the social status and compensation of lab animal
veterinarians in the wake of federal laws regulating the treatment of laboratory animals.361 When
changes to the Animal Welfare Act were being considered that would regulate the treatment of
lab animals through the use of institutional animal care committees and other efforts to minimize
the pain and suffering of these animals, the proposed changes initially met with opposition from
laboratory animal veterinary associations.362 After the Animal Welfare Act was amended,
however, the salaries of laboratory animal veterinarians increased markedly, as did their job
satisfaction and job security.363 They also reported that, after the law’s passage, their advice was
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more often heeded.364 In this case, it was the legal changes that improved the status – through
improved protections – of laboratory animals that precipitated the improvement in both the status
and compensation of the veterinarians who treated these animals.
Some improvements in the status and salaries of companion animal veterinarians are already
resulting from the expansion in the way society values companion animals. Pet owners’
increased willingness to spend money on their animals’ care is, not surprisingly, resulting in
increased remuneration,365 and likely increased regard, toward veterinarians who treat
companion animals. Not only are these practitioners benefiting financially, the therapeutic
options they can offer are also expanding because of the increased valuation of animals.366 And,
despite the fact that farm animals greatly outnumber pets and companion animals,367 the vast
majority of veterinarians practice only or mostly with companion animals.368 A change in the
legal status of companion animals that codifies society’s increased regard for these animals can
only continue to improve the status and salaries of companion animal veterinarians.
Raising the legal status of companion animals to something above that of inanimate
property would also be more consistent with way veterinarians view themselves as professionals.
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When Rollin has presented his pediatricians-vs.-truck mechanic model to veterinarians, he has
found that over ninety percent lean toward the pediatrician model.369 This is perhaps not
surprising, given that most veterinarians work in companion animal rather than agricultural
practices. The law’s treatment of animals as property, however, treats veterinarians, in many
respects, more closely to the way it treats others who repair inanimate property.
Recognizing that the status of animals should be different from other forms of property is
also consistent with the view of the veterinary profession reflected in the code of ethics of the
American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA).370 The code contains a number of
references to the principle that a practitioner’s primary obligation is to her animal patients. The
first provision of the Professional Behavior section of the code sets out the following obligation:
“Veterinarians should first consider the needs of the patient: to relieve disease, suffering or
disability while minimizing pain or fear.”371 This provision, not unlike the Hippocratic oath’s
“first, do no harm” highlights the important role that veterinarians, like doctors, play in treating
their patients’ diseases and injuries. And considering the needs of the patient first is certainly
different from any kind of obligation or ethic that a professional whose work involves repairing
inanimate property would have. Another provision of the AVMA ethics code, regulating
influences on judgment, sets out a similar obligation: “The choice of treatment or animal care
should not be influenced by considerations other than the needs of the patient, the welfare of the
client, and the safety of the public.”372 While recognizing that public safety concerns, along with
the client-owner’s welfare (which presumably includes inability to pay for expensive treatments)
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can influence treatment choices, this provision begins, however, by considering the “needs of the
patient.” The language choices alone are instructive: the code’s use of the term “patient”
certainly envisions a professional role that is closer to its counterpart in human medicine than to
the mechanic who works on a car or truck.
Elevating the legal status of animals is not only more consistent with most veterinarians’
view of their own professional role, it is also more consistent with the reality of today’s
veterinary practice. No longer primarily serving the utilitarian needs of the agricultural
industry,373 the current face of veterinary medicine involves practices that serve primarily
companion animals, with an increasing reliance on specialty practices.374 Dogs and cats now
benefit from increasingly sophisticated diagnostic techniques including ultrasound, MRIs, digital
radiography, and CT scans.375 Treatment options include surgery, chemotherapy, and radiation
treatments for cancer, hip replacements and other complicated surgeries for orthopedic problems,
and even dialysis and kidney transplants to treat kidney disease.376 Clearly, neither the pet
owners who choose these sophisticated and expensive treatments, nor the veterinarians who
practice them, are regarding the animals being treated as just another form of property. The legal
status of animals needs to better reflect this perception, giving it more credibility, better intuitive
appeal, and all-around coherence.
Academic veterinary practice recognizes the non-property status of animals in even more
direct ways. A number of veterinary schools now include departments or centers that focus on
the human-animal bond. At the University of California at Davis, for example, the Center for
Animals in Society supports research on areas such as therapeutic and health effects of pets and
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their role in human development,377 and includes resources such as the Program for Veterinary
Family practice and the Pet Loss Support Hotline.378 Highlighted on the Center’s main web page
is the declaration, “The inspiration for our activities is the rapid evolution of the relationship
between people and animals.379 A similar program was established at the University of
Pennsylvania’s School of Veterinary Medicine in 1997. Penn’s Center for the Interaction of
Animals and Society (CIAS) describes itself as a multi-disciplinary research center whose goal is
“to promote understanding of human-animal interactions and relationships across a wide range
of contexts …, [by] [s]tudy[ing] the positive and negative influence of people’s relationships
with animals on their physical and mental health and well being [and] [i]nvestigat[ing] the
impact of these relationships on the behavior and welfare of the animals involved. . . .”380
Clearly the development and support for such centers reflects a recognition, within the academic
veterinary community, that the animals they treat are very different from the cars and trucks that
mechanics repair. Creating a legal category that recognizes this different status would bring the
law more in line with a reality that veterinary schools have long understood.
Veterinarians could also benefit from an improved legal status of companion animals
because such a status could help to alleviate some of the problems they face when their treatment
options are controlled by the sometimes irrational and harmful choices that client-owners can
make. When animals are viewed as property by the law, any choice of how to treat (or not to
treat) an animal is basically the owner’s to make, even if that choice is very much against the
animal’s interest. Only in the rare case where the owner’s treatment choice violates an animal
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cruelty statute381 can that choice be overridden. And because humane euthanasia is considered a
standard, and in fact ethical, treatment choice in veterinary medicine,382 there is ultimately little
that a veterinarian can do when a client requests that a healthy animal be euthanized, even for the
most trivial of reasons.383 While courts have found ways to invalidate such requests as “against
public policy” when they come in the form of testamentary provisions,384 there is little that can
be done under current laws to dissuade living clients from finding someone who will perform
what has been dubbed “convenience euthanasia.”385
Rollin reports that the request to euthanize healthy animals is the most stressful and
demoralizing part of companion animal practice.386 Some of the real examples of convenience
euthanasia that he cites are just horrific: “clients going on vacation and not wanting to pay
boarding fees, or clients tired of an adult dog and wanting a puppy, or clients who have
redecorated and the dog doesn’t match the color scheme . . . .”387 Choices such as these, awful as
they may sound, are essentially supported by our current legal scheme that regards animals just
like other pieces of personal property. But while few would question the choice to get rid of a
couch because it doesn’t match the dog, there just seems to be something wrong killing a dog
because it doesn’t match the new couch. One way to limit such choices is by elevating the legal
status of companion animal so that they cannot be treated just like any other form of property.
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A new legal category for companion animal property could respond to the need to better
educate people who might choose to have pets when it is convenient, but who would then choose
to euthanize them when it is not. This goal is consistent with the educational goals of the
“owner-to-guardian” campaign – helping pet owners to understand that they have greater
responsibilities to their pets than to their inanimate property.388 Such understanding would be
beneficial to the veterinary profession because it could help to reduce the stress they face when
asked to euthanize healthy animals.389
Another beneficial effect of this educational role might be to reduce the number of
unwanted dogs and cats in animal shelters. While many members of the public view their
animals as family members, establishing strong bonds with them and taking good care of them,
there are others whose behavior indicates that they still see companion animals as disposable
property.390 Our current laws do little to dissuade people from this attitude. An understanding of
pets as “companion animal property” and the increased responsibilities that would come with
that understanding could go far in stopping both “convenience euthanasia,” and revolving-door
shelter adoption.
388

See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
Although part of the opposition raised by veterinary groups to the use of guardianship language was the
concern that owners would have less control over medical decision-making for their pets, it is unlikely that such
decision-making would face interference unless the owner were making unreasonable choices. If we look to
pediatric decision-making as a model, parents’ decisions regarding their children’s medical care are rarely interfered
with, and then only if they are putting their children in danger. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979):
[P]arents generally “have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their
children] for additional obligations.” Surely, this includes a “high duty” to recognize symptoms of
illness and to seek and follow medical advice. The law’s concept of the family rests on a
presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for
judgment required for making life’s difficult decisions.
There is no reason to expect any difference in the owner-animal relationship. If anything, even with a legal
status elevated above mere property, but well short of personhood, it is likely that there will continue to be much
more deference to pet owners’ choices. The only choice that will be interfered will be those that are simply
unjustifiable. And ultimately it should be a benefit to veterinarians who treat companion animals to be able to limit
precisely these kinds of choices.
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Veterinarians thus stand to gain in a number of ways from a new legal status for
companion animals. And there is likely to be more support for this position if it can be
accomplished in ways that do not implicate their concerns of increased malpractice liability or
decreased control over their professional choices. Carving out a new legal category such as
“companion animal property” could alleviate many of the concerns expressed by those who
oppose the language change from owner to guardian. Unlike the term “guardian,” this new
category has no established legal meaning, and it could be precisely tailored so that it achieves
the beneficial effects that the veterinary profession would support, without the unintended
consequences that might come with an established legal term. In fact, some veterinary groups
that have opposed guardianship status have, at the same time, registered their support for some
change in the legal status of animals. The Pennsylvania Veterinary Medical Association, for
example, approved several position statements on March 9, 2005.391 One of these statements
sets out their opposition to the use of the term guardian.392 But the Position Statement on Pets as
Property, approved on the same day, sets out their support for changing the property status of
pets:
[W]e feel very strongly that animals are not property in the same way that tables,
lamps or cars are property.
...
We further believe that an appropriate definition of a pet must be
developed prior to any changes or expansions in the laws on damages for pet loss.
In our search of PA law and the laws of other states, we have been unable to find
an adequate definition for a “pet” or “companion animal” that would allow us to
reach a consensus on the subject of pets as property. PVMA is developing a
definition and welcomes comments from all interested parties.393
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This forward-looking group realizes that the profession, the animals they treat, and the owners
who care for those animals all have much to gain from developing a new legal definition that
better captures the way that we as a society value our companion animals.
Conclusion
Although the law has traditionally treated all animals as property, there are an increasing
number of areas where the legal system is beginning to recognize that companion animals are
fundamentally different from other forms of property. These changes in the law are just
beginning to catch up with the way in which our society values companion animals. We should
formally recognize these changes by creating a new legal category for companion animals that
better reflects their status as somewhere between property and persons. Creating this new
category will help lead toward more consistent treatment of animals across various areas of law,
and treatment by the legal system that will better reflect the way in which we value our animals.
While the veterinary community has in the past opposed any change to the legal status of
animals, professional veterinary groups are now beginning to realize that such a change is not
only inevitable, but also desirable. Veterinary groups will benefit by the creation of such a new
legal category and by helping to shape its parameters. It is in the profession’s best interests to
support and develop changes in the legal status of companion animals because these changes will
have a positive effect on the professional role of veterinarians, will lead to more consistency with
the realities of their practices, and will give them better opportunities to exercise their
professional judgment.
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